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# **West Europe Report**

No. 1775



**FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE**

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## TURKISH PRESS REACTS TO AGCA

## Agca, Half-Man

Istanbul 8. GUN in Turkish 17 May 81 pp 12-14

[Article by Yildirim Cavli]

[Text] Every time I saw him, my eyes fastened themselves on his knobby, jet black, stubby fingers, and, for some reason, I thought about goats. More accurately, I faintly recalled creatures who were half-goat, half-man.

I first encountered Mehmet Ali Agca at 10 o'clock, 11 July 1979, in a cramped room assigned to the political division in the Security Directorate Building in Gayrettepe. Later, we were together a number of times at the military court in Selimiye where he was being tried. Finally, we came together in the Forensic Medicine Building in Gulhane, from which he did not attempt to escape although he had the opportunity.

The sinister aspect of an international terrorist began to emerge during the days of questioning.

That he was very different from other murderers, other convicts struck one at first glance. It made no difference to him whether he lived or died, whether or not he was condemned to death, whether or not he was sentenced to life imprisonment. It was as if he knew that he had entered this world by mistake and had no right to continue an ordinary existence amongst other men.

I wholeheartedly believe that, now, the Italian prosecutors will not be able to uncover the dark sides of Agca's past or of the makeup of his soul. Agca will again provide the prosecutor and the police with the amount of information he wishes to give and will adroitly keep hidden the points he wishes to conceal. He will confess with sincerity a great number of details. Istanbul Security Director Hayri Kozakcioglu fell into this error, which could not generally be detected at the time, and, in a statement to the press, said that Agca had sincerely admitted everything.

Yes, Agca, by following a truly masterful and intelligent plan at the most critical moments, candidly confessed a number of details, but held back the one or two points that suited his interests.

It is not easy to forget how, when asked to name the organization or persons who were behind him, the murderer rubbed his chin and shouted, "I am a solitary terrorist." For various reasons, the Istanbul police were forced to cut very short their questioning of Agca. Therefore, police, who were compelled to accept the "sincere" confession without obtaining the answers to questions regarding two significant and basic material elements in Abdi Ipekci's murder, the pistol that was used in the killing and the money that was in the bank, sent the suspect to the prosecutor. There is no need to be a fortune-teller to predict that this scene will now be reenacted in Italy. The murderer, who will pleasantly relate to Italian authorities all the details of the planned attack on the Pope, will omit the few small points that he selects.

There is no doubt about Agca's intelligence. He is identical to "Carlos" Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, who is known throughout the world by the code name, "Jackal," and Daniel Cohn-Bendit. In fact, Agca was able to complete Malatya Lycee without devoting much time to studying. He passed the entrance examinations and was enrolled at Ankara Teachers Training School. Agca remained idle for a year, not once attending the school or picking up a book or pen. He took the university entrance and placement examinations in 1978, was successful in the general competency portion in particular, and was registered in the Istanbul University Faculty of Economics.

A second important characteristic he shares with international terrorists is his irrational confidence in himself and his complete control of his nerves. He was even able to emerge in good spirits from the renowned room where questioning takes place in the basement of the political division's building. Whereas his friend, Yavuz Caylan, trembled from fright thinking of what was to happen to him and covered his face with his hands, Agca gave a statement to reporters like a director general who is accustomed to holding a press conference every week. Agca, who mocked the prosecutor who sought the death penalty, walked up to a newsman in the corridor of the court and, with his hands in handcuffs, frightened the journalist saying, "You're from the AYDINLIK newspaper. I am going to strangle you." Later, he took pleasure in announcing that he was only joking. When he was being sought throughout Turkey and an order was out to shoot him on sight, he was able to rob a restaurant for pocket money. He was able to tell, with the pedantry of a judge, an accomplice who hid him how many months the crime would incur under the Turkish Criminal Code.

#### Backers Unknown

As with other militants under the command of international terrorism, it is not easy to make a decision as to Agca's affiliation or what he supports. Although he was friends with and lived with National Action

Party members for a long period of time, Agca never stressed the fact that he was a Turk either before Ipekci's murder or afterwards. When arrested in Rome, Agca at one time said he was an Arab student and at another time stated that he was of Armenian origin. Even if this behavior is interpreted as a tactic, isn't it part of the feeling that lies in his fundamental makeup, that he "does not belong anywhere"?

Agca, who, on one hand, used Marxist terminology to describe religion as an "opiate," on the other hand, had, as a fanatic Muslim, severely reproached those who designed the attack on Mecca.

Agca was born in Malatya, studied in Ankara, lived in Istanbul, fled to Anatolia, easily escaped to Germany, was able to come and go among the Benelux nations, and performed in Rome the action that earned the condemnation of the world. He operated under the principle of "not acknowledging any national boundaries," which is a basic characteristic of international terrorism. Like the Carloses, Rudis, Ulrikes, and Baaders, he had a large amount of money on him. The source of the money is not clear.

It is evident that Agca closely followed the activities and fates of international terrorists. When Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe were found dead from suicide in their cells in the prisons in which they were being held in West Germany in 1977, Agca probably became suspicious. How else can his lawyer's request to have him transferred from a prison dormitory to a one-man cell be explained?

It can be seen that the policy of "gaining time" was plainly pursued when the Ipekci case went to trial. Questioning was prevented at the initial hearing before the martial law commandant court even though there was no need to do this and it was more harmful than beneficial to Agca. He claimed that he had not received photocopies of his dossier. I recall that our eyes met for an instant. It appeared as if he was thinking of other things very distant from where he was. When he was asked about the money in bankbooks, he momentarily became agitated, but quickly regained his composure and deftly changed the subject.

It is known that Agca is not sincere with anyone, not even with cellmates in his "prison dormitory." It is believed that, prior to Ipekci's murder, the cooperation initiated with Mehmet Sener was continued in Germany. When Agca was arrested, everyone dwelt on the question, "Who was behind him?" Agca, however, attempted to portray the image that "no one was behind me."

The same question is applicable today.

Who is behind Agca?

Or is he, as he himself stated, merely a "solitary terrorist" working against us? In other words, is he a maniac who murders for fun, who assassinates to gain fame, who pulls a trigger to earn a reputation? There is no doubt that Agca is a maniac.



When I asked Agca why he killed Ipekci, he said, "To defend the system." However, we were unable to learn what type of dreams for a system lie within the mind or, if he has one, within the heart of Agca, who has often stated that he opposes the system.

#### A Sick Soul

When talking about the great man he killed, he spoke as if he were talking about a piece of furniture and made it clear that he has no intimate nor remote ties with "pangs of conscience." However, is he from the same class as the maniacs who are frequently seen on the "murder market" or those who wish to gain a reputation by killing a man? Following his arrest, he abstained from creating opportunities to have himself talked about constantly. When entering a hall during one of the recent hearings, he made conversation with reporters, asking, "See here, is there anything left of importance to get from me? Why are you still after me?" It is not his custom to engage in scandalous behavior, to create an incident, to make a "show." If it is his sickness to get himself noticed, he certainly believed that this could be accomplished through enormous actions rather than artificial means. Hadn't it been possible for the psychopath with a mania for infamy to remain in hiding for more than 1½ years?

Following the shooting of the Pope, I looked once again at Agca's "death list." Agca had announced with evil enjoyment, both to the police and at hearings, the names of persons he considered killing. A great number of industrialists and rich businessmen were on the death list. Could we, from this, conclude that he is an "enemy of wealth"? No, because Agca has also given a distinct answer to this question: "No, these persons will not be killed because they are rich, but because they symbolize the system."

However, the last two names on the list struck everyone as incongruous at the time. They were the "Russian and American consuls."

Even before Agca murdered Ipekci, he had either made up his mind to become an international terrorist or had this in his mind because of his lunatic instincts. The Russian and American consuls? At that time, there were a great number of underground organizations that wished to kill the Russian consul or the American consul in Turkey. However, probably only Agca wished to see them both dead at the same time.

All the experience obtained during the Istanbul police's questioning of Agca and the trial in the martial law court will now be used in Italy. It is my guess that Agca's single purpose for the moment will be to gain time once again. He will, as he did in Turkey, try to gain time, cause people to forget about him a bit, and then escape from the Italian prison as he escaped from the Armored Brigade Prison in Maltepe in November 1979.

Even if he were a terrorist who acted alone, there are now a great number of organizations throughout the world who would protect Agca. There are



terrorist organizations that would like to add to their cadres an international terrorist who has committed two such enormous and sensational acts, who would strive to be able to help him. If Agca is able to escape once again, this would not be only a personal feat for him, but would be interpreted as a crushing victory of terrorism over the established system.

The Mehmet Ali Agca I know is half-man. In other words, what is human about him is his outward appearance.

### Open Arms for Terrorists

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 18 May 81 p 9

[Article by Yilmaz Cetiner]

[Text] Every intelligent Turkish citizen has known and has believed for years that terrorism and anarchy are not rightist nor leftist, but have the clear purpose to injure and kill men, destroy the state, and divide and dispose of the people. And a large majority of Turkey's writers, intellectuals, and even politicians supports the same view. There is a consensus of opinion and a meeting of minds that the number one problem of the nation is security of lives and property -- that is, the freedom to exist.

Yet, we see that, for some reason or other, several of our top-ranking politicians whose lives have been protected 24 hours a day by hundreds of state employees since before the 12 September change in government are unable, in any way, to get to the heart of the problem of "security for the lives and property of citizens." The more opportunities they find at home and abroad to do so, the greater the opportunities provided by their associates, the more their statements collide with one another.

"My friend, security of life and property and freedom to live are not sufficient! Where would be life's flavor? Who wants a humdrum existence?"

Of course, it is not sufficient. Who would claim otherwise? But, if men in a nation do not first have the freedom to live and do not experience security for their lives, we wonder who can use other freedoms and how?

Because we, by ourselves, have seen the realities for years and have perceived the results of experiments, these criticisms do not carry much importance. We have lived through so much, additional burdens do not overwhelm us. However, how does one explain his concerns to opportunists abroad, to foreigners who try to fit Turkey into their own individual molds, the images they have within their own minds?

This has been a bitter lesson for all mankind. The lesson of how grave is the danger of the terrorist and anarchic nightmare, which seeks to set the

entire world upon Turkey and which, through the desire to kill the Pope, the leader of the Christian world, resulted in his being seriously wounded, should not have had to be learned.

We are hearing from our colleagues assigned to large cities in Italy, Germany, England, and other Western nations that the people of the world have been discussing Turkey, Turks, and terrorism for days. The primary and most important news item on television has been the wounding of the Pope. The opinions and interpretations of noted writers and experts are broadcast at every hour of the day. Millions of persons are following the story with interest.

And how fortunate it is that it is seen that, from the very beginning, Turkey and the Turkish people are not being held responsible for this shameful attack. In other words, in most countries, the facts are not being distorted in order to create animosity towards us. Of course, this does not include several of our neighbors whose various jealousies, grudges, and schemes have long been known.

The most significant reason, which has been relayed to us by friends and neighbors abroad, why we have not been judged by public opinion in this incident is this: President Kenan Evren gave an extremely sincere and extremely open statement and was immediately able to divert this bothersome incident toward the correct direction. He said:

"The wounding of the Pope clearly and profoundly revealed what dimensions international terrorism has reached. I believe that some of our European neighbors who have had their heads in the clouds have been enlightened, even if ever so slightly, by this incident.

"An incident that is extremely shameful and the fact that the person who committed it is a Turkish citizen deeply grieves us. However, you know that we had condemned this citizen of ours to death, but he escaped across Turkish borders. This has to be the result that occurs if some of our European neighbors open their arms to terrorists who flee from our country and call them political refugees."

This statement of President Evren was broadcast on European television for days. Newsmen and commentators all approached the incident using this theme.

Did, with the exception of three to five members of the extreme left whose actions are predetermined, the large majority of the Council of Europe members who possess common sense have to learn this lesson through bitter experience? The powerful force within the Council of Europe parliament

consists of nothing other than Christian, Catholic voters who have strong religious ties, who respect the Pope. It was clearly European politicians and bureaucrats who serve under their command who opened their arms for months, protected, and probably even fed the terrorist who had taken the life of a valuable newspaper editor in Turkey, who had received the death penalty, who had escaped, and who sought to kill the Pope, the most eminent religious leader of these Christians. The Pope, however, was able to transform the threshold of death into a precious miracle. This was the incident. Those responsible for the incident are none other than the three, four, or five grasping European politicians who seek to break up and divide Turkey using the "song of freedom" and those who work at the suggestion and under the command of these politicians.

After making the statement quoted here, President Evren turned to First Army Commandant General Necdet Urug and said:

"Those who question us as to whether or not torture is used in Turkey should now go to Italy and inquire as to whether or not Agca is being tortured."

Yes, it is true, but it is impossible not to be surprised by this. Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, Germans, and Britishers will crowd together in Rome with reporters and members of parliament and will undoubtedly investigate and inquire as to whether or not the terrorist Agca is being tortured in order to get him to talk and reveal the facts so that the incident can be understood. And we believe that, when Agca begins to sing like a night-ingale and tell who is behind this conspiracy and other plots, members of the European parliament will begin to have suspicions, will find themselves in Rome, and will undoubtedly cross-examine all legal counselors and officials. If such a claim is made (and we do not believe that it will be true), the Italian Communist Party, socialist parties, and others will all immediately arise and will severely complain that torture was used to get the terrorist who shot the Pope to talk. And, undoubtedly, they will ask that Italy be expelled from the European parliament.

Still, we do not believe that such an event could occur in civilized, western nations, in nations that are able to open their arms to terrorists.

#### This Assassin Agent

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 15 May 81 p 2

[Article by Ahmet Kabakli]

[Text] Ever since I heard the news, I have been setting out and calling in protest:

"A premeditated act that will outrage, anger, and disgust the entire Christian world has been committed. Furthermore, it is understood that the perpetrator of this crime is an accursed man who bears a Turkish and Muslim name, Mehmet Ali Agca."

Now, in the simple, fanatic, and egoist crusader world, you will see how Islamic-Turkish hatred, which never diminished, will increase again and become furious.

Moreover, you will still be unable to explain in the Council of Europe to its so-called "members of parliament" who seek the freedom to implement their schemes of seeing the blood pour from us and us engaged in civil war what sorts of things we have suffered because of the Agca, because of this type of assassin agent and the divisive, terrorist groups to which these men belong.

Let us hope that some members of the Council of Europe who, besides being mindless, insincere, and opportunistic, walk around in the clouds and suppose themselves to be overseers of Turkey's destiny will now begin to think about how many times our mothers have been made to cry by the terrorism that reached a peak with the spilling of blood during a sacred, religious ceremony at the Vatican.

Let us also hope that the European press, radio, and television, which, when our ambassador was, likewise, shot at the Vatican, looked at our suffering with mocking and invented fairy tales calling the Armenian terrorism that is directed by communist foci the result of "the massacre of Armenians" so as to develop throngs of enemies against Turks, will, in the face of this recent criminal act, which undoubtedly is the customary product of such an "organization," recall its own words, "God" and "justice."

There is no doubt that this Agca belongs to an international red terrorist organization, which, in the name of Armenians, spills Turkish blood and spreads enmity towards Turks across the face of the earth. As a matter of fact, at the moment he was arrested, he confessed, "I am a Turkish Armenian. I am an international terrorist."

That this is so is also understood by the "most eminent" target he selected. You think, could he have found a victim other than Pope John Paul in order to provoke a reaction and produce rage amongst a large group of people when fulfilling his goal to make this world hear about "Turkish barbarism and Christian Armenians' enmity towards Turks"? This Pope is both a Pole, of a people that has earned the world's sympathy and is also, in a sense, a spiritual leader of all of Christianity.

Look, too, at the day and hour chosen for the crime. At a time when a group of irresponsible members, who came to Strasbourg simply to enjoy



themselves with their mistresses and gambling partners, were debating, "I wonder if I should throw the Turkish nation out of the council or leave it in," merely because of its struggle with the anarchy that took lives, seven bullets were fired at the Pope, who was performing his religious rite of love.

In Turkey, interpretations about the assassin agent named Agca were fundamentally wrong and dangerous. From where had this man come? Why was permission given on the day he was captured to bring him before the press so that he could sing like a nightingale?

The 1979 minister of interior held private discussions with this murderer and later informed the prime minister, who was hosting Bulgarian Chairman Zhivkov in Antalya, of their talks.

This Agca, in a statement made in court, recounted that the same minister of interior said, "If you confess that so and so were behind this crime, we will rescue you in a few years."

Which extremely powerful organization, which international red terrorist organization later had this assassin agent transferred from the Selimiye Military Prison to the Kartal-Maltepe Second Armored Brigade Military Prison; rescued him from this prison on 23 November 1979; took him to Europe after sheltering him in Turkey for a long period of time; gave him, after feeding and housing him, arms for the purpose of taking the Pope's life? It would certainly be ludicrous to look for this armed, wealthy, terrible organization in Turkey. In that case, who is and what is this assassin agent? The need for new investigations and questioning during which justice is respected to the utmost is evident.

#### Attack on Pope

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 15 May 81 p 2

[Article by Rauf Tamer]

[Text] Should we now sit down and once again engage in a "leftist-rightist" debate over Agca, or should we establish a "common attitude" or even a "joint plan" against the world so that a great people will be able to emerge unscathed from this loathsome incident?

We gave our judgment long ago.

We, as a nation, had expelled him from our ranks.

We, as a court, had sentenced him to death.

What else can we do?

Why should 45 million Turks bear the responsibility for a murderer who will find himself, in any case, on the gallows the moment he returns to Turkey?

This sorrow that crushes us like a nightmare must be quickly stripped from us, and while this is being done, we must explain to the West:

"He is not one of us. However, he is one of those to whom you give political protection."

We came to the 12 September change in government after fighting and wrestling with this wild beast.

What happened? Who on earth was this person? Being unable to comprehend, how did we let him slip out of our fingers?

To say, "My friend, he is a fascist," is not sufficient.

If it were, the next question would be, "Well then, is the Pope a communist?" Then when it is recalled that the Pope is Polish, new arguments would begin. As a result, whether or not he is a fascist or a "commie," a communist, both the crime and the criminal would remain our responsibility.

Why should they?

Our first order of business is "to settle the matter once and for all" and "not, by any means, to take the responsibility on ourselves."

On the contrary, we should turn to the West and say:

"You...you set aside an hour on television for reportage on an individual. You issued him a work permit, a residence permit. You opened your doors and arms to a criminal of ideas. And this was not enough. A storm broke out in the Council of Europe against Turkey. You sent inspector upon inspector. Take this, take that, you commanded. We had been wrestling with terrorists who fire at men you worship. Moreover, we, as a nation, had warned you earlier saying, 'Be careful. A movement might be underway.' What is what Agca has done to me? In truth, what would it be to me if the man who could not go out on the streets of Turkey had insinuated himself as far as the Vatican empty-handed? No one in Islam would aim a gun at, much less 'lift a hand to strike,' a man of the cloth. And let me say more. The life of my director of the Office of Religious Affairs is not insignificant. It is the problem of who suffers the greatest pain. Only when bullets explode at your door will you understand what we have been going through for years."



Do not let anyone come up and say, "We are against the enormous Christian community."

We must settle the matter once and for all by saying that there is no relationship between us and this loathsome attack.

Whatever international organization is behind this, whatever game is being prepared, it is outside, completely outside, totally outside our realm.

If fragments of terrorism still remain in Turkey today, the reason is directly due to the "West's forbearance." And its "unbelievable attitude."

We ask that the criminal be returned, and it will not return him.

We revoke his citizenship, and it enfolds him in its arms.

Then, it repeats misleading, empty words from afar.

This is a snobbism of democracy. It is not its profession. It is its avocation. It is not reality, but is the world of illusion.

We were able to explain several things to our own intellectuals after a 10-year delay. It was when guns began to explode at our doors that we screamed for help calling, "Alas, whose turn is it now?"

We will continue speaking on this topic in tomorrow's column.

I denounce the attack with disgust, and I say with insistence to my grieving people:

"It is the duty of everyone not to take on an historical or divine stain. Ideologic nonsense can never blacken the honor of 45 million people."

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CSO: 4907/272

## TWPP TRIAL GETS UNDERWAY IN ANKARA

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 16 Jun 81 pp 1, 16

[Text] The trial of the Turkish Workers and Peasants Party [TWPP] began yesterday in Ankara's Number Two Military Court. The trial opened with a move by the Ankara Martial Law Command Prosecutor for sentences ranging from 8 to 15 years. The 24 defendants are charged with "establishing an association whose aim was to foment the oppression of one social class by another." The 130-page indictment prepared against the TWPP defendants states that the party was established legally. But owing to relations with communist parties of foreign countries, casting aspersions on the Turkish Army, involvement in Marxist-Leninist activities, and, through such activities, its causing death and injury to soldiers and Turkish National Intelligence Organization (TNIO) officers, the party assumed an illegal character.

Dogu Perincek was heard first followed by other defendants. It appeared as though there were more lawyers in the chamber than observers and defendants. After the formal identification of the defendants, the military prosecutor began reading the 130-page indictment. Perincek and his associates listened quietly.

When the military judge, during the identification procedure, asked Dogu Perincek, "What is your occupation?", Perincek said that he was a doctor of law. When the judge used the phrase "former General Chairman of the TWPP" to describe Perincek, Perincek objected by saying that he was still the General Chairman, that his party had not been shut down, but that its activities were at a standstill. Two foreign professors are observing the TWPP trial. International Lawyers Association and International Human Rights Federation member Professor Pierre Mertens of Belgium and International Permanent Peoples Court member Ernst Urtrecht of Holland observed yesterday's session to the end.

The indictment asserts that the TWPP bears a striking resemblance to the illegal Turkish Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Party (TRWPP), whose leaders were placed under investigation previously, that the TWPP behaves along the lines of this party, and that there are parallels between the two with respect to charter, views, and goals. The indictment further notes that TWPP members counted several individuals who underwent Al-Fatah training and died as party members and martyrs. The document states that the party was active in six fields. These were training and party school work, publishing activities, meetings and conferences, relations with prison inmates, plans and activities with respect to the army, and TWPP counter guerrilla

publications aimed at fragmenting the Turkish Army. The indictment declares that the defendants knowingly formed an illicit association and that they disclosed their criminal intent by stating their aims to the appropriate officials.

The indictment observes that the TWPP acted along the lines of the TRWPP, whose culpability has been established by the court, and that it was guided by Marxist-Leninist as well as Maoist thought. The document also notes that all party activities and goals were geared to the dissemination of propaganda and organization along these lines.

Calling attention to large photographs of several individuals found on page 16 of the 130-page indictment, it has become apparent as the result of examination that these individuals were bonifide party members. It is stated that of these persons Bora Cozen, Cafer Topcu, Kerim Ozturk, Ali Kiras, Sukru Oktu, Ahmet Ozdemir, Yucel Ozbek, Ismet Disbudak, Gurol Ilban, Ismet Yuce, Kazim Gostas, Mustafa Sargin, Metin Arikan, Riza Yerli, Mehmet Kucukdal, and Mithat Ayri died either while undergoing Al-Fatah training or during various anarchic incidents. These persons were regarded as "martyrs" by the party. Although dying before the party's founding, these persons, according to the indictment, were counted as party members. The indictment also notes that the party held a ceremony on the anniversaries of their deaths.

It is stated on page 26 of the indictment that the charter of the legally established TWPP has been compared with that of the TRWPP and similarities were observed. The document maintains that the TWPP chose the death date of the illegal Turkish Communist Party's (TCP) founder, Mustafa Suphi, as the date for its own establishment. Moreover, the indictment makes note of TWPP and TRWPP land reform programs and points out the similarities between the two parties--one legal, the other illegal.

The indictment continues that the TWPP gave particular importance to establishing relations with Marxist-Leninist parties of various countries. It notes that meetings held with members of these parties were verified through transcripts. However, although the views of these other parties appear in the transcripts, TWPP views regarding such topics as the Turkish Army and the Kurds do not appear. It is stated that these were not included since views expressed by the TWPP on these matters during various conferences and meetings were illegal in nature.

On page 111 of the indictment it is maintained that the TWPP constantly monitored the TCP and its Bizim Radyo [Our Radio] broadcasts and that it taped these transmissions.

The indictment asserts: "The defendants have maintained that these broadcasts were constantly monitored with a view to following them and then responding to these enemy transmissions and their ideology. Even this attitude and statement appears as proof that the party is struggling for the sake of [orthodox] Marxist-Leninist ideology, that it is sensitive to all judgment and commentary regarding this ideology, and that it harbors a drive to immediately respond. It places no value in an official government response to the broadcasts of these organizations targeted against the Turkish State."

The indictment prepared against the TWPP defendants presents the party's views with respect to the Turkish Army. It states:

"The fact that the party in its founding proclamation stated, 'There must be an end to all coercion, physical abuse and insult leveled against soldiers in the army.' This statement was made despite the protection afforded all rights of active-duty officers, NCO's, and privates in the Turkish Armed Forces by the Constitution and the laws. It is proof that the party is perpetuating the views that a backward discipline is being used in the army based on coercion and physical abuse of soldiers who are workers and peasants and that soldiers are under ideological constraint resulting from the constant encouragement of a racist and militarist spirit."

The indictment observes that the party's counter guerrilla responses were not merely for show. The document states:

"The principal aim is seen to be the fragmentation of the Turkish Armed Forces and facilitation of the party's illegal activities by neutralizing TNIO, which is the country's most important intelligence organization. During searches of the party's general headquarters, counter guerrilla diagrams, drawn on a large piece of cardboard, showing the names of the then-current president of the republic, chief of the general staff, martial law commanders, high-ranking officers, and security and TNIO officers were seized. Also seized were large photographs--affixed to the cardboard--of several individuals whose names appeared on the diagram as well as documents containing their biographies and residence and work addresses. Several of the individuals shown on the diagram have been killed or wounded as the result of the party's 'Let's Reckon With the Counter guerrillas' campaign and articles in their newspaper AYDINLIK. In fact, there is strong evidence that Assistant Under Secretary Bulent Ozturkmen was targeted as the result of these articles. The defendant's counter guerrilla target is the entire Turkish Armed Forces; their aim is to fragment the Turkish Armed Forces, protector of the existing constitutional order."

The indictment's closing section states that 8 to 15 year sentences are being asked for the defendants in accordance with Article 141/1 of the Turkish Penal Code. The defendants, Doctor of Law and General Chairman Dogu Perincek, Chairman Council member Oral Calislar, Kemal Cankiran, who was a doctoral candidate in Germany, Elazig Provincial Chairman Bedri Gultekin, charter member Turmus Uyanik, Central Committee member and Istanbul Provincial Chairman Halim Spatar [as published], Central Committee member Mehmet Cengiz, Central Committee member Salin Comez, Central Committee member Riza Boka, charter member Kamil Saydam, charter member Erdogan Yemenici, charter member Kabil Konyali, charter member and day care center director Inci Ataberk, charter member Fuat Terzi, charter member Israfil Tekin, charter member Mustafa Karayunlu, charter member Riza Sari, charter member Ahmet Sencan, former Cankaya District Chairman Lokman Olgun, Cankaya District director Nezir Artan, Tuzlucayir representative Mehmet Yucel, and charter member Mustafa Ovacik are under formal arrest at the Mamak Military Prison. Defendants Fatma Bursali, an Istanbul university assistant, and Cankaya administrative council member Asi Yazici are being tried without formal arrest.

The defendants' attorneys have maintained that their clients are being tried because of the party's charter, program and public statements and that, consequently, the trial should be conducted not in the Martial Law Military Court but in the Constitutional Court. In response to the attorneys' statements, the military

prosecutor declared that the party's status had been assessed during the investigation and that the matter had been referred to the public prosecutor. He further stated that the prosecutor's office had initiated proceedings based on the actions of the defendants and that the Martial Law Military Court was competent to try the case.

The bench decided to hold the defendants and begin questioning on Monday, June 22.

CSO: 4654/37



## SENATOR REVIEWS NATION'S ENERGY POLICY

Paris L'EPAULETTE in French Jan-Mar 81 pp 14-18

[Article by Jean-Francois Pintat: "France's Energy Policy in the World Situation"]

[Excerpts] Editor's note: No one would question the fact that the problem of energy, the economy's motor, critical factor in the independence of an industrialized country and a material condition of modern lifestyle, dominates current events.

To help us in this research, Jean-Francois Pintat, senator from Gironde, mayor of Soulac and a member of the assembly of European communities, was kind enough to give his thoughts on this subject to "L'Epaulette." A former unionist, member of the upper council for gas and electricity, member of the upper council for oil, recorder of the energy budget and president of the Senate's energy group, Mr Pintat is without doubt one of the most authoritative voices in France on this subject. In his article Mr Pintat first described in detail the present international energy situation. Due to a lack of space in this issue and in order not to delay publication, we have focused on French energy policy.

Faced with the challenge presented by oil producers who increased prices fifteen-fold in 7 years, threatened with economic suffocation or, at least, with a serious lowering of the standard of living and an increase in the unemployment rate to intolerable levels, France, whose few fossilized resources make it particularly vulnerable, has reacted quickly.

In order to ameliorate this situation of dependence which compromises France's political freedom and has caused an excessive financial burden, the French government has put into operation an ambitious and voluntary energy policy since 1974, the principal points of which follow:

- the implementation of a vigorous program of nuclear construction;
- support for the development of national coal resources and the importation of coal;
- encouragement to conserve energy;



- research into new energy sources; and
- a renewed effort to find oil in France.

#### A). The Nuclear Energy Program

The most important measure incorporated into the energy plan was undoubtedly the decision made in 1974 to accelerate the nuclear reactor construction program. The goal is to increase our nuclear-supplied power to 40,000 megawatts by 1985, which by that time could furnish us with the equivalent of 43 million tOE [tons of oil equivalent] and supply 20 percent of our energy needs, including 55 percent of our electricity. By about 1990 available electro-nuclear power should reach 58,000 megawatts and supply 30 percent of our energy needs, including 70 percent of our electricity.

So that this program does not keep us dependent on foreign sources of uranium (we have so far been getting our enriched uranium from the United States and the USSR), the administration has financed a significant effort to find and develop both French and foreign uranium deposits; has built, in cooperation with several friendly countries, a very large uranium enrichment facility in Tricastin (EURODIF); and has constructed a facility for the treatment and processing of nuclear wastes in Cotentin. Thus, as of today, our country has at its disposal several powerful means which make nuclear energy an energy which can truly be called "national."

France is different from other countries in its continued efforts to handle the entire uranium cycle, despite ecological questions which have been raised. France has been even more original and bold with its program of building breeder reactors, of which Creys Malville (1200 MW) is the first industrial scale prototype. With this technology almost all the uranium is utilized, rather than just the very small percentage of "naturally" fissionable uranium. The energy potential of the extracted uranium is thus increased 50 to 60 times.

#### B). The Coal Program

Despite the exhaustion of our coal fields, which each year are more difficult and costly to mine, the authorities are trying to maintain coal's importance, particularly for the production of electricity. As a result, the tonnage of coal used in generating stations has increased to 28 million tons, or two times greater than in 1973, while overall consumption has gone from 45 to 52 million tons in the last 6 years, mostly due to imports which will reach 33 million tons in 1980. Our principal suppliers at present are: the Union of South Africa, 9.5 MT; West Germany, 7.9; the United States, 7.5; Poland, 3.6; and Australia, 1.7.

Because of two different measures, this use of coal has been maintained:

- an allocation of 2,300 million francs to the National Coal Board aimed at maintaining the competitive level of our coal production, which is about 50 percent more expensive than coal on the international market; and
- active financial encouragement to use coal, particularly in industry (a subsidy of Fr 250 per tOE saved).

### C). Energy Conservation

The goal initially established in 1975 was to reduce energy consumption by about 15 percent compared to the level it would have normally reached by 1985 based on use before the oil price rise. This meant that by the established date energy use would drop from 285 to 240 million tOE, that is, a savings of 45 million tOE.

This goal was revised to 35 million tOE because of a revision in our 1985 energy consumption forecast to a level of 230 million tOE.

Beyond this, the government has established a goal of 50 million tOE to be saved.

But this is certainly not the easiest part of the program to implement. Although savings were rapid in 1975 and 1976, particularly in residential and tertiary sectors (-10,000 tOE for home and commercial heating), this was undoubtedly helped by particularly mild winters. Results were much more disappointing in transportation (-3,000) and industry (-3,500), and at the end of 1979 overall energy savings were 18,000 tOE.

What must be accomplished in the next 5 years is a savings of six million tOE in industry, six million in residential and tertiary, 2.5 million in transportation and 2.5 million in production.

This will entail not only renewed waste reduction but also an improvement in engine efficiency and even replacement of engines. Thus, a significant conversion effort will have to be undertaken.

This effort to conserve also involves techniques for recovering and utilizing thermal waste, and was the subject of a bill adopted by parliament at the end of summer.

Money given to the agency for energy conservation has increased rapidly, going from 30 million francs in 1975 to 570 million francs in 1979 and 600 million francs in 1980.

Today, emphasis is primarily focused on industry, residences and automobile transportation, and has taken the form of subsidies, monetary incentives and demonstration projects.

### D). New Energy Sources

The amount of money slated for new energy sources was 300 million francs in 1979, of which 241 million francs were earmarked for solar energy and its by-products and 59 million francs for geothermal energy.

On an organization level, new energy sources (with the exception of geothermal) come under the Solar Energy Commission which was established in 1978.

#### 1) Solar Energy

France can count on direct solar energy to supply no more than 2 or 3 percent of its energy needs by the year 2000.

It is still too soon to estimate the contribution of biomass, but it could possibly be a more significant source, especially if woodburning and the use of gas produced by organic decomposition is included here.

## 2) Geothermal Energy

Using the heat from underground water located at depths of 1800 meters or more is a promising technique which has benefited from the advances in drilling methods made by oil companies.

Such underground aquifers exist in France in the major sedimentary basins (Ile-de-France, Aquitaine, Alsace, Limagne and the Rhone delta). However, due to the often low temperature of these waters, they can only be used on site for the heating of large groups of collective dwellings. In addition, their use does not eliminate the need to install traditional auxiliary installations.

Despite these reservations and the rather high investment cost, several groups of two to three thousand dwellings, the equivalent today of 16,100 residences are already geothermally heated. For the most part these buildings are located to the east of Paris and in the southwest. Another dozen housing projects are underway.

Research and financing for these undertakings has been almost completely assured since the beginning of 1978 by Geochaleur, a private company with government participation, which includes the Union of Low-Income Housing Organizations, the Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration, the National Savings Bank, the National Coal Board and the Building Society.

At the end of 1979, 21,500 dwellings were being supplied with geothermal energy but starting with 1980 it is thought that this could increase annually by 40,000 to 60,000. On a basis of 1.2 tOE per apartment this would mean a savings of about 1 million tOE by 1990, or .3 percent of our needs at that time.

In sum, renewable energy resources will constitute about 8 percent of our energy use in 1990.

## E). The "French Oil" Program

No matter what results we hope to achieve from energy conservation and the use of new technologies, oil will play a significant, if not primordial, role in our economy for a long time. Our dependence on oil will be our Achilles' heel, since this product is almost impossible to replace for certain uses, such as transportation and petrochemistry.

It is probably because of this and because of the possibilities opened up by new techniques in searching for deposits, in drilling and extraction that has led the government to renew the search for oil in France by increasing from 430 million to 1 billion francs the amount of money consecrated to this effort.

Thus we can expect to extract several thousand additional tons of this precious "black gold," which will somewhat lighten our oil bill. As we said at the beginning of this article, France has seriously evaluated the grave threat posed by the tenfold increase in oil prices and the ever present possibility of an

interruption in the supply of this "black gold" by producers whose political stability can be upset at any moment.

Unlike her principal European competitors, France has neither the abundant coal and lignite supplies of West Germany and Great Britain, nor North Sea oil, nor the gas of the Netherlands.

Because of this, our back is to the wall and the spectacular industrial advances our country has made in the last 25 years precisely because of oil could be reduced to nought unless we can obtain, at a reasonable price, this product which is indispensable to economic activity.

Our country has confronted the facts and essentially looked towards technology to remedy our lack of natural resources.

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CSO: 3100/768

## AGIP DISCOVERS OIL DEPOSIT OFF APULIAN COAST

Rome IL POPOLO in Italian 27 May 81 p 11

[Text] Venice--An oil deposit has been discovered by AGIP [National Italian Oil Company] at a depth of 827 meters off the Apulian coast, which yielded a first production test flow of over 3,000 barrels of high-quality crude a day. The discovery was announced yesterday by Vice President Marcello Colitti of the ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] group company at the opening of the Congress of the European Association of Geophysicists in Venice.

Colitti added that the completion of the Aquila 1 exploratory well off the Apulian coast points up the fact that "Once the commercial viability of this discovery is proven, the need to bring in productive deposits at such seabed depths will require that a further effort be devoted to the study and actualization of innovative vanguard technologies."

An ENI message to the Congress says: "AGIP's oil discovery is evidence of the potentials that an effort based on advanced technologies can offer for the resolving of particularly complex problems in the field of mining exploration, as well as evidence of the effort AGIP devotes to adaptation, modernization and innovational experimentation to accomplish its institutional purpose. The meeting in Venice, between Agip's engineers and technical experts and the world's geophysicists," the message continues, "provides an opportunity for an interchange on an international level of experiences in technological and operational exploration. The carrying forward of such exploration will in fact be made realizable through the innovative concepts that are certain to spring from the proceedings of this meeting, which is, as Vice President Colitti of AGIP has said, a constructive moment in the building of contemporary civilization's energy future--a future that is tied, in increasing measure, to the ability and professional quality of its engineers."

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CSO: 3104/285



## ENEL INAUGURATES SOLAR STATION IN SICILY

Palermo GIORNALE DI SICILIA in Italian 26 May 81 p 13

[Article by Guido Fiorito]

[Excerpts] Minister Romita inaugurates this morning the Adrano solar station. It will be the world's first solar plant to be interconnected with the electric power network.

The Adrano plant is an experimental one. For the EEC and for ENEL [National Electric Power Agency], both of whom very much wanted this station, it is a test bench of the potential for using mirror-type plants on a larger scale. They have called it "a flower in our lapel," an ambiguous definition that evokes the image of a technological jewel as well as a concern lest it remain an isolated example of an alternative that is not entirely convincing.

"No responsible authority of our times"--wrote Aurelio Peccei, leader of the Rome Club, the group of qualified experts that studies the future of humanity--can shrink from the duty of determining whether the nuclear road is the obligatory road that must be followed, or whether energy flowing from the sun can provide an alternative for large-scale uses as well, under acceptable conditions." The people are awaiting an answer, and shortly, from Adrano.

The Sicilian plant represents a cooperative European effort led by the Italians with the French and the Germans, and based on the studies and practical applications of Professor Giovanni Francia, who, 16 years ago in Genoa, when the oil crisis was still remote from coming into being, built the first tower-supported plant for the production of electricity from the sun's rays. Some of the most technologically advanced components of the Adrano plant were built by Ansaldo (and through it, by SAEM [Electrical Appliances Company, Monza] of the Rendo group for the boiler). Adrano could thus give rise to a future Italian solar industry capable of overcoming Italy's dependence on foreign sources for other forms of energy (oil and coal) and for nuclear energy.

But why is all of this taking place in Sicily? For once, an incontrovertible fact has prevailed: the highest level of insolation in Europe.



The experimental nature of the Adrano plant is confirmed by its low power output: one megawatt suffices for the annual needs of about 1,000 families. The major problem remains the cost factor. The production of one kilowatt-hour of energy by the Adrano plant costs today almost nine times more than the same amount produced from oil. The comparison, however, is between the product of a technology that is still in the experimental stage and that of technologies that have been developed over many years. Whether or not this gap can be closed by tower-mounted mirror-type plants is another answer being awaited.

The future of solar energy, however, it must be understood, does not lie solely in this type of plant but also in photovoltaic cells, which convert the sun's rays directly into electrical energy, and in solar panels for domestic use, with a view to decentralized production of energy. With regard to photovoltaic cells, the construction of a plant, the world's largest, near Foggia in the very near future is now being talked about.

The inauguration of the Adrano plant comes just as Industry Minister Pandolfi announces for June the new energy plan, which is to focus on nuclear energy, and as the Association of Solar Panel Manufacturers, made up of the principal firms in that sector--in which all of 220 enterprises are now engaged in Italy--is being formed.

#### **Eurelios's Identity Card**

Following are the identifying details of the Sicilian solar plant:

**Name:** Eurelios (Europe's sun).

**Location:** Adrano, 35 kilometers from Catania.

**Design and construction:** European industrial consortium, composed of Ansaldo Impianti (Italy), ENEL (Italy), CETHEL (France), MBB (Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm) (FRG).

**Ownership:** ENEL (50 percent), EEC (50 percent).

**Management:** ENEL (It is interconnected with the national electrical network.).

**Nominal power output:** 1,000 kilowatts (that is, 1 megawatt).

**Overall efficiency:** 16 percent.

**Total mirror (or heliostat) area:** 6,200 square meters.

**Number of mirrors:** 182 (70 manufactured by CETHEL, each 52 meters square; 112 by MBB, each 23 meters square).

**Area occupied:** 35,000 square meters.

Steam temperature: 512 degrees.

Steam pressure: 64 kilograms per square centimeter.

Tower height: 55 meters.

Storage capacity: 30 minutes.

Persons employed: 16 persons (normal operation).

Annual energy production: Expected to be about 1.5 million kilowatt-hours, an amount corresponding to the annual consumption of about 1,000 families.

Construction time: Slightly less than 2 years.

Description of operation: The sun's rays are reflected by mirrors onto a boiler, located atop a tower. The boiler heats water from the Simeto river and produces superheated steam which drives a turbine (coupled to a generator), which in turn produces electrical energy. This energy, after going through a transformer, is fed into the network. Thus, the sun's radiated energy is converted into heat; the heat is converted into mechanical energy; and the mechanical energy is converted into electrical energy. The positioning of the mirrors is governed by a computer which causes them to move in a way that ensures their receiving at all times the maximum number of sun's rays. At night, the mirrors are closed up.

Reserve: Part of the steam produced by the boiler is used to feed a thermal energy storage facility which enters into operation when heat is not arriving from the sun (for example, when the sky is overcast and cloudy). This storage facility enables the plant to operate an additional 30 minutes under these conditions.

#### PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. Upper Left. The plastic model shown above gives a general idea of the Adrano plant: Mirrors at the base of the tower "shoot" the sun's rays up to a boiler located on top.
2. Lower Left. The array of massive mirrors that focus the sun's heat on the boiler.
3. Right. The tower that supports the boiler in which water heated by the sun is transformed into thermal energy.

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CSO: 3104/285

## RESULTS OF 1981 LABOR NEGOTIATIONS ASSESSED

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 13 May 81 p 16

/Text/ At the end of the 1981 labor negotiations employers and labor unions are left with the feeling that they just managed to get by once more. For future negotiations, though, both parties will have to think up new strategies.

Heinz Kluncker, chairman of the OeTV /Public Service, Transportation and Communications (labor union)/, merits praise. This year public servants have brought a special sacrifice--not by completely foregoing wage increases but by scaling down the percentage rise. Federal Interior Minister Gerhart Baum was careful not to say so loud and clear. But, when the results of the negotiations were made public, he was unable to refrain from indicating that the flat rate amounts of DM120 for February and March can certainly not be interpreted to mean that the agreement exceeds 4.3 percent.

DM120 represents 4.3 percent of a DM2,800 income. In the postal service and the railroads, for examples, jobs carrying incomes of DM1,500-2,800 account for 90 percent of the total. The employee earning DM1,500 stands to gain nearly 5 percent (annualized) by this public service standard wage agreement. At the other end of the scale increases for higher earners have been held down.

The situation is exactly reversed in the second sector affected by the crisis, the steel industry. Here the 4.3 percent agreement is not nearly so moderate as appears at first sight. Actually the final agreement in the steel industry amounts to a 4.7 percent rise consequent upon the agreed backdating of the negotiated standard wage despite all possible allowances. Even the 4 percent agreement concluded in the construction industry--lauded as exemplary--in fact comes out to 4.8 percent.

The greatest advance was doubtlessly achieved in the metal industry. Any possibility of a 4.9 percent agreement had been rejected by the North Rhine-Westphalian employees, while the Hessen union leadership and also the federal executive of the IG /Industrial labor union/ Metal misjudged the mood of the rank and file, discovering that the 4.7 percent negotiating result was unacceptable to the members. Consequently metal employers and the IG Metal shifted the latest possible negotiations to Baden-Wuerttemberg--a standard wage region where, according to the wishes of both parties, the negotiating train was not supposed to have come to a stop in this negotiating round.

Both in the national executive and the districts there are a lot of people who consider that the Stuttgart district head of IG Metal has gotten too big for his breeches. Moreover, the IG national executive was intent this year to avoid a battle at almost any price--even that of a 4.7 percent agreement--, although in battle-tested North Wuerttemberg/North Baden metal workers were more than ready to go out on strike. "Better to lose DM100 million than lose the confidence of the members"--that was the situation confronting the members of the tariff commission. The metal employers for their part realize that the desire for compromise is greater among their Baden-Wuerttemberg colleagues than anywhere else in the metal industry.

Paul Pleiger, chairman of the North Rhine-Westphalian metal employers federation, resigned his functions at the national federation as a demonstration of support for a harder line. Several IG Metal functionaries, too eager for compromise and misunderstanding the mood of the rank and file, may also have to reconsider the situation in the labor union. Still, the conflict in the employers camp is of longer standing and more serious than a dispute about a regional federation getting out of line.

The rivalries of district chairmen among themselves or between the federal executive board and some district chairmen of the labor union are only the surface ripples in the dispute about the social situation of the Federal Republic. In both camps it is a matter of deciding whether the struggle for distribution should, in the 1980's, run along the obsolete lines of the class conflict or change into the consensus of autonomous social groups which respect one another.

The long drawn-out 1981 labor negotiations have provided us with a foretaste of the things to come.

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CSO: 3103/324

## FUTURE OF NATION'S ARMAMENTS SALES DEBATED

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 4 Jun 81 pp 66-67

[Article by Antoine Thiboumery: "Armaments--Limited Maneuvering Room"]

[Text] Their eyes fixed on the Quai d'Orsay, military leaders and armaments industrialists are waiting. For if France is in luck today when it comes to weapons sales, there is no certainty that it will always be thus, despite the recent confirmation of major orders.

France now ranks third in weapons exports. In 1980, Jean Martre, general director for armaments, has just revealed, deliveries of French military equipment to foreign countries came to 25 billion francs as compared to 20.5 billion in 1979. Finally, the orders placed in 1980 beat all records: 35 billion francs, or 10 billion more than in 1979 (25.2 billion).

The weapons industry is indeed in luck. Stagnant just some 20 years ago, it plays an important role in the national economy today.

Is the change in the majority likely to pose a threat to the future of this sector? Are the armaments industries threatened? Finally, is France likely to slip downward on the list of leading gun merchants? For the time being, no answer has been provided, but the minister of foreign affairs has made it clear that contracts will be honored from now until French diplomatic levels make a decision on the countries (South Africa, Chile, Argentina) which may be subject to an embargo. Should we conclude that henceforth the new government will try to establish morality in weapons trade and refuse to deliver equipment to countries at war with another (Iraq)? Should we then expect a substantial reduction in exports of military materiel?

## Key Countries Confirm Their Choice

The very first days of Francois Mitterrand's government term do not give us sufficient perspective to be able to reach a conclusion one way or the other. However, it must be noted that in the space of just a few days, three major orders for military or paramilitary material have gone to France, one from a portion of India and two others from the Cameroon and Saudi Arabia. All three are key countries for France: the first mentioned because it is a major new client, the second because it is in Africa, and the third because along with Iraq, it is one of our best weapons customers.



India decided in fact to opt for the Mirage 2000 combat aircraft built by Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation. At present, the Indian minister of defense and the principal French builders (AMD-BA and SNECMA) are arranging the final details of delivery. If India does not go back on its choice, it will be the first foreign country to be equipped with the Mirage 2000, which is scheduled to go into use in 1983-1984. In all, it will be a question of an order for 150 aircraft, some of which will be built in France, while the balance will be built on the spot in the workshops of the Indian Hindustan Aeronautics Limited company (HAL).

The second item of good news pertains to the order for three telecommunications satellites placed by the Arab Satellites Organization (ASCO, in Ryad) (see below). With this Arab order, it would seem that Aerospatiale is gaining to some extent in the matter of satellites and also weaponry (weapons systems and missiles) over its counterpart and competitor, Matra. We remember the recent clashes between Matra and Aerospatiale which preceded the selection of Matra as the prime contractor for the Telecom 1 satellite. The wind has shifted to the benefit of Aerospatiale, a national company headed, let us recall, by Jacques Mitterrand, the brother of the president of the republic.

Finally, the last of the orders received by France involves the sale of six Alpha-Jets to the Cameroon, designed in cooperation with Germany, under the responsibility of Dassault. The Alpha-Jets are already used as equipment by a dozen air forces, involving a total of almost 470 planes.

#### Still Waiting

But it is doubtful if these three orders are sufficient to dispel the uncertainty which weighs on this industry at present. Jean Martre did not conceal his concern a few days ago in Paris. "If the new government chooses to make a substantial modification in our foreign policy, our military production is likely to become three or four times more costly. Then the problem will arise, even in the medium-term range, as in Sweden, as to whether it is desirable to retain an industry which guarantees our national independence or not. If this is the outcome of the new government direction in this realm, we will have to obtain our supplies from the United States or the USSR to meet our defense needs! Which is the same as saying that we will have to take one side or the other."

On the industrial side, the spokesmen are less loquacious. "The less said, the better," said a large French weapons exporter. However, there are many rumors circulating about contract cancellations, reports and requests for information...about the intentions of the government about the plans for the nationalization of Dassault, Thomson and Matra (weapons branch, precisely).

Today, exports of military materiel (a vast majority of which goes to the Gulf countries!) account for 43 percent of the turnover (60 billion francs in 1980) of the weapons industry. It employs some 300,000 persons (the aeronautics branch alone, for its part, employs 110,000, and had a turnover figure in 1980 of 34 billion francs of exports accounted for 60 percent). In other words, these activities are very sensitive to foreign market development. After all, weapons exports account for at least 5 percent of the exports of France.

## PAPER COMMENTS ON GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC REPORT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 May 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The government has stopped predicting price developments. We agree with them in this. Predictions on what would happen to the Norwegian economy in 1981 have proven wrong in one area after another, and as happened so often before, this is also true with prices. As many predicted when the government's economic plan was presented just before Christmas, a strong inflationary wave is building up, threatening Norway's ability to compete. While other countries, among them some of our most important trading partners, have been to some extent successful in slowing the rise of prices and costs, here at home we are seeing a complete runaway. The adjusted national budget that was presented at the last cabinet meeting, confirms that the government has lost control. The lack of consistent, unified economic policy is more obvious than perhaps at any time before. The effects of this will soon become very serious. We have already seen quite a few of them.

The rise in prices and costs has always been one of the main problems in economic policy here at home. But in spite of the fact that the problem has been recognized in a responsible way and that--apparently--there is agreement on what we must do, the government has followed a financial policy that has just gone from bad to worse. The government has not taken into account what it itself says is necessary.

The revised national budget gives--in the main--a complete description of the serious situation we are in. And indirectly this document is an admission that the policy followed up to now has not been appropriate to the needs of the Norwegian economy and of trade. But what now? The initiatives the government is now suggesting are of marginal significance to the problems we are facing in reality. Just as little as before does the government have a well-defined policy that can restore the forces of growth in our economic life, strengthen our competitive ability, and ensure employment over a long period. The government sees problems, but it cannot do anything with them. This again shows how decisively important it is for the present government to be defeated in next fall's elections.

In the revised national budget, the government says clearly what can happen if the development we are in is not broken. After having stated that the economic policy goal will be to reduce prices and costs in 1981 and 1982 to the level of our trading partners, the government says: "If we lose contact on a more permanent basis with our trading partners, there will be a rapid fall in our economy, which is based on competition. The goal of full employment and work for all can then be jeopardized."

Yes, this is just the way it is. Too bad the government keeps on fumbling around.

9124

CS0: 3108/146

## INDUSTRY FEDERATION LEADER SEES WEAKENED COMPETITIVE POSITION

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 16 May 81 p 8

[Text] "The most disturbing thing we see is a drop in competitive ability of 3 to 4 percentage points in 1981," Egil Bakke, Branch Director in Norway's Industrial Federation, said today in a commentary on the government's revised budget. "And a continued strong increase in costs is expected in 1982," he added.

Egil Bakke wonders how the government will meet this development. The cause is the strong pressure in financial policy. Therefore a tightening up should be welcome. The question is whether it will be enough, if it is done at all, he said.

In the revised national budget, the government writes that wage increases in 1981 can be so great that they can cause "severe problems for growth through the year and into 1982."

The government has estimated that wage increases will reach 10.5 percent in national negotiations, and 12.25 percent in municipal ones. At the press conference yesterday, the Minister of Finance, Ulf Sand, said that the settlement between LO [Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions] and the Norwegian Employers Organization would probably end up at this level.

The document that the Finance Minister presented in the cabinet meeting gives the last estimate for the increase in wage costs per unit produced at 8 percent on the average for our trading partners, at the same time that the rise in productivity in Norwegian industry will be 0.5 percent. If Norway is to keep up on a competitive level, therefore, wage costs in Norwegian industry must not rise more than about 8.5 percent from 1980 to 1981.

Instead of a 2 percent increase in industrial investments from 1980 to 1981, the government now expects a decline of as much as 5 percent. To counteract this development, the government is channeling funds from loans for consumer purposes to industry and the bond market. Egil Bakke is skeptical about this. "In the main, the development in investment is the result of industry's low profitability." He also points out that generally low level of private capital in industry, only 15 percent on the average, makes this, more than lack of credit, a hindrance to investments.

9124

CSO: 3108/146

## PAPER VIEWS WORSENING ECONOMIC TREND, RIKSDAG POLICY DEBATED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Jun 81 p 2

[Editorial by Svante Nycander: "The Catastrophic Alternative"]

[Text] A new concept has arisen in the economic debate: the catastrophic alternative. By that is meant the more pessimistic of the two examples of calculating the country's economy during 1979-85 which the Long-Term Planning Commission (LU) has put forth. It starts with the assumption that production and consumption will develop according to the same model as during the latter part of the 1970's. The result will then be, among other things, that the deficit in the balance of payments will triple to 59 billion kronor and that unemployment will double to 4.5 percent.

So far developments have followed the catastrophic alternative fairly well.

Each year the government puts forth a long-term budget which shows how decisions already made will influence the country's finances 5 years in the future. In 1977 it was calculated that the budget deficit for 1981/82 would rise to 12 billion kronor. This year it is calculated that the deficit for 1985/86 will rise to 99 billion.

It is also enlightening that government expenses in the current budget year are increasing by 28 billion, in spite of the savings package. When the budget was put forth in January of last year the increase was calculated to go to only 15 billion.

This rapid growth toward catastrophe was the background for the Riksdag economic debate on Tuesday. What will the parties do?

The bourgeois majority has proposed several savings targets. For 1982/83 they want to reduce the budget deficit by 12 billion kronor in relation to the long-term budget. If this is compared with actual expenditures 1981/82, it amounts to a reduction of the country's expenditures (exclusive of interest on the national debt) of eight percent in fixed prices. If defense and pensions are excepted, other national expenditures must be reduced by 10 percent.

The national debt this year corresponds to 12.5 percent of the gross national product (BNP). The long-term goal is that the deficit will be reduced by one percentage point per year.



The bourgeois parties want to reduce the rate of increase of the total national expenditures from five percent per year to one percent per year, calculated in fixed prices. Local government consumption should not increase by more than one percent per year, as against an average of four percent up to now.

The social democrats reject the bourgeois savings targets. They say that the government "has not explained the reasons which led to the numerical establishing of the goal." They do not believe that the recommended cuts in national expenditures for 1982/83 are feasible. They maintain that public consumption, like the private, must be "held back." But it can not be reduced "with reference to the urgent needs which must be satisfied even in difficult economic times."

The social democrats do not agree that the growth of local government consumption should be limited to one percent per year. They want to grant two percent increase, primarily to allow more room for growth in child care and care for the aged.

According to the social democrats, tax increases can not reduce the budget deficit in any decisive way. The reason, among others, is that the different taxes influence each other negatively: increase one tax and the base is reduced for another. The social democrats point out that past bourgeois tax increases have not had the desired result.

Their reasoning emerges in a requirement for "an economic policy that will allow growth in the economy." There is also a central task to fight inflation vigorously, they say. Further, it is necessary to eliminate the deficit in the balance of trade.

We are not joking! The social democrats completely refuse to concern themselves with the catastrophic situation of the Swedish economy. They do not even pretend to put anything in the place of the policy which they reject.

Only a few weeks ago the social democrats wanted a new election, which was to take place 14 June. They were eager to take over the government. To do what? Before 1976 the social democrats thought that the opposition had an obvious duty to propose in detail their alternatives to government policies. Gunnar Strang would have made pulp of an opposition party that had so little to propose as the social democrats have today.

AFTONBLADET (social democrat) raises loose thinking to a national art. The newspaper wrote last Sunday that the greatest danger for social democracy is to begin to govern from the opposition's position, to act as "proxy managers." The party must first see that there is a majority on the Left in the Riksdag--"then we can begin to govern."

This is a recommendation to social democrats to consciously hoodwink the voters. When the majority has been won, the party will then first disclose its real intentions.

There are more things to worry about in Sweden than "the catastrophic alternative."

## FARMERS TO CUT PRODUCTION AS HIGH PRICES REDUCE FOOD BUYING

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Jun 81 p 12

[Article by Thomas Michelsen: "Concern at Farmers Meeting: Surplus of Meat Threatened"]

[Text] Eskilstuna, 10 Jun--Increased food prices are forcing farmers to cut their production. Swedes are buying less, primarily of expensive meat and pork. The export of meat and pork is not an economic solution. Prices on the world market are much lower than Swedish prices. Exporting could only lead to losses.

At the meeting of LRF [Federation of Swedish Farmers] in Eskilstuna on Wednesday a voluntary limiting of farmers' production was discussed.

The chairman of LRF, the farmers' union, Erik Jonsson recommended in his opening speech that the farmers themselves should limit their production.

"That is much better than to be hit later by severe, merciless adjustments of production which a drastic fall in prices could bring about," said Erik Jonsson.

The question of reducing meat and pork production is becoming a controversial issue in the farmers' organization. Some speakers on Wednesday reacted sharply against Erik Jonsson's recommendation.

## Export Losses

Olle Andersson from Skane said, for example, that LRF should instead demand a new agricultural policy which would support the export of meat and pork. He said that the state should cover half the export losses of meat and pork in the same way that the state covers with taxes part of the losses for the export of Swedish grain.

Other speakers demanded more merchandising for Swedish food. Swedes should be induced to buy more food in spite of the high prices.

"We must see to it that the Swedes give priority to food," said Sture Jonsson from Vastmanland.

Once before, in the beginning of the 1970's, LRF discussed limiting farmers' production. At that time, however, no reduction was carried out because Sweden increased their consumption of food.

DAGENS NYHETER asked Erik Jonsson why he thought that farmers should cut down their production. Erik Jonsson said that the problem now is primarily one of meat and pork.

"It is important that we have a balance between production and consumption," said Erik Jonsson. "The world market is generally a dumping market where countries send their surpluses without a thought for what they cost to produce. We want to avoid a price squeeze on meat and pork in Sweden. A price squeeze would threaten production. If the farmers receive less for each pig they may try to produce more pigs so that they can protect their gross income.

#### Cut Down

Erik Jonsson said, however, that it is not a question of shrinking total agricultural production, only certain products. He pointed out that Norway, Finland and Austria, among others, have different systems to make sure that production of such things as milk do not become too great.

Which model is to be chosen for Sweden will now be investigated within LRF. One group is already studying the milk problem, and on Wednesday LRF set up another group which will study meat and pork.

Erik Jonsson said that he was not unhappy that the price increase of at least 27 ore per liter of milk will cause Swedes to buy less milk. "Perhaps we will have a short-term decline, but it will be regained shortly. But we are unhappy about the situation with meat and pork."

In his speech to the LRF meeting Erik Jonsson also launched an attack against the import of foods to Sweden. He said it was too liberal, and could lead to underemployment in agriculture and unemployment in the food industry.

#### Buffalo Meat

As an especially frightening example Erik Jonsson brought up the import of so-called wild game from Australia. It is buffalo and kangaroo meat. Furthermore, the buffaloes are tame and raised on ranches, but are sold as wild. Australians themselves will not eat buffalo or kangaroo meat, said Jonsson. Furthermore, the meat is hardly fit for human consumption. Buffalo have poor health conditions, and kangaroo meat is so bad that it must be dipped in antibacterial solutions to reduce the risk of infection from salmonella.

"The result is served to unsuspecting Swedes in restaurants," said Erik Jonsson.

## BRIEFS

RIKSDAG DECIDES ON CUTS--Stockholm, 10 Jun--Yesterday the Riksdag voted in favor of the government's efforts to save 12 billion kronor in state expenditures in next year's budget bill. This will have an influence on the living standards of large groups, but it should not hit those who have the least, according to the government. The background of the new savings target is that a budget deficit of about 75 billion kronor is projected for next budget year. The growth of municipal expenditures will be limited to one percent for 1982 and plans for expansion of child care and care for the aged must be adjusted downward. Social contributions will be more carefully distributed, meaning that they will go to special groups. Increased self-risk will occur with illness, for example. A comprehensive tax reform will be introduced in 1983 in accordance with the desires of the social democrats, liberals and centrists. The conservatives supported the three-party government's tax bill from last February with some adjustments. Their demands were, however, defeated by 230-65. The 15 communists abstained. The social democratic proposal was also defeated. It included eliminating the indexing of living costs to prices, reducing the budget deficit, heavy taxes on profits from securities and monetary exchange rates to exclude international price increases. Municipal expenditures next year would have been allowed to increase by two percent according to the social democrats' wishes. The proposal by the communists for creation of 100,000 new industrial jobs, reduced discount rate and price controls on all necessities received only the votes of their own members. Voting took place several hours earlier than expected, because the last 10 speakers on the speaker list withdrew. Wednesday will be the last working day for the Riksdag. They will deal with industrial policy and the question of state guarantees for the Winter Olympics in Sweden in 1988, among other things. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Jun 81 p 8] 9287

CSO: 3109/203

## DEVELOPMENT AID MINISTER ON THIRD WORLD, U.S. POLICY

Hamburg DMI SPINDEL in German 8 Jun 81 pp 27-29

[Interview with development aid minister Rainer Offergeld at Bonn Ministry for Economic Cooperation, by SPINDEL editors Klaus Wirtgen and Richard Kieselers: "Sometimes It's Quite Alarming"]

[Text] SPINDEL: Willy Brandt, chairman of the North-South Commission, considers German development policy and the intelligence of those who carry it out to be "behind the times." Do you think he's talking about you?

Offergeld: No, I don't think so. Brandt means that there is too little awareness among the FRG public of the explosiveness of North-South problems. And he's right.

SPINDEL: Brandt has complained that those concerned with development policy are merely favoring us with "old, hackneyed phrases." This rebuke was probably intended for the chancellor, who had one of his lapses when speaking to the North-South Commission at the end of May in Berlin.

Offergeld: The fact is that we have made obvious progress in development policy since Schmidt has been setting the guidelines. Unlike the trend in other countries, we have steadily increased our development aid in recent years.

SPINDEL: The chancellor put the blame on others for the dismal international economic situation: He attacked the OPEC countries for their excessive oil prices, the East for its arms deliveries to the Third World and the South for its population explosion.

Offergeld: These are causes of problems that absolutely can't be solved on a short-term basis. I mean the population and oil-price explosions, for instance. They simply cannot be offset solely by development aid from the industrialized states.

SPINDEL: But Schmidt is ignoring the responsibility of the industrialized countries when he attacks the states of the Third World.

Offergeld: I wasn't there. And besides, it's better to talk to one another without diplomatic blinders. The frankness of the talk in Berlin was a dress rehearsal for the upcoming North-South summit in Mexico.



Wittke: The chairman of the North-South Commission is a German. Why has there been as little response to the North-South report in the Federal Republic, of all places?

Offerguld: There's a very simple reason for that. For instance, there aren't even enough copies available in the bookstores.

Wittke: You can't be serious.

Offerguld: Furthermore, the Germans have always preferred contemplating their navels to looking beyond their own borders. Just take a look at the provincial reporting in the forest of German journalism to see if anything is being written about the Third World.

Wittke: Western statesmen — with Helmut Schmidt leading the pack — are yammering about heavy burdens that their countries are having to bear. So where is there any hope for the developing countries, which Willy Brandt sees heading for bankruptcy one after another?

Offerguld: Bankruptcy — a state in which many of them already find themselves — can be averted only if the Western industrialized states intensify their efforts and if the OPEC states help out more than they have so far. And many developing countries themselves must make more of an effort.

Wittke: But you yourself are critical of the fact that no one here at home is prepared to make sacrifices for the benefit of the Third World. So what do you tell your colleagues who say that first we need development aid for the region's depressed steel industry and for the shipyards on the coast?

Offerguld: Our relationship with the Third World concerns not only sacrifice; it concerns us. After all, we need the export markets for our goods. I would also say to them that none of us can count any longer on the growth rates that we're used to. And I think I'll be understood, partly because approval of our development policy has been increasing significantly, particularly among the younger generation. The only thing is, such a radical process of changing people's awareness can't be effected from one year to the next.

Wittke: So you're going to ask for more development aid even if German workers have to accept cuts in social benefits?

Offerguld: That's right. We have to try to increase our development aid in the coming years as well.

Wittke: But that doesn't mean that you'll succeed.

Offerguld: I'm quite sure that contributions for development aid will rise even in lean years. That's a consequence of the international legal obligations that we assumed with parliamentary approval.

Wittke: Your budget increased by 2.8 percent for 1981. In light of the planned increase in social benefits laws, the prospect of coming off so well again is illusory.

Offergeld: It's too soon to say. But I'm going to fight for my budget.

EPSTEIN: The heads of government of the seven most important Western industrialized countries are meeting in July in Ottawa for an international economic summit conference. It looks as though the Third World countries are pinning their hopes on the German chancellor, of all people.

Offergeld: The Third World states see us Germans in a position of leadership in development policy. Their expectations of us are sometimes quite alarming. We definitely can't fulfill them by ourselves.

EPSTEIN: Well, what will the Third World get in Ottawa?

Offergeld: I won't venture any prophecies, partly because two new, self-willed individuals with very dissimilar political views....

EPSTEIN: ...Reagan and Mitterand....

Offergeld: ...will be taking part, men with very different perceptions of North-South policy. I can say only one thing: Without the Americans there can be no successful Third World policy.

EPSTEIN: So the heads of state of the developing countries can expect nothing more than hope from Helmut Schmidt at this conference?

Offergeld: We're banking on the continuity of American policy. We're hoping for a growing appreciation of the Third World's problems.

EPSTEIN: But the Americans are cutting their development aid rigorously. And they intend to favor those Third World countries that support the United States' new policy, even if it's a matter of racist regimes or dictators. Are you resigned to the fact that the Americans are doing precisely what the Europeans have always wanted to avoid — namely, carrying the East-West conflict over to that between the North and South?

Offergeld: No, I don't accept that. But surely the new administration's North-South policy has not yet been completely formulated. Nevertheless, a fundamental principle of European policy continues to be that of strengthening the independence of the developing countries and not drawing them into the East-West conflict insofar as possible. The Federal Republic and — most assuredly — our French friends will stand firm on this.

EPSTEIN: El Salvador certainly doesn't fit into this scenario. It didn't take long for the Americans to drag the East-West conflict into the quarrel.

Offergeld: Yes, but the American government's present position is substantially more complex than it was just a few months ago. The realization has also gotten around in Washington that social conflicts are at issue there and that world communism isn't necessarily at work everywhere.

EPSTEIN: You're saying that Bonn doesn't yet know what the Americans have in mind. All politicians use this excuse when asked to interpret the new U.S. policy.

Offergolds: I certainly won't deny that we're concerned about the Western alliance's North-South policy. Just looking at the new U.S. administration's restrictive stance toward the World Bank makes me fear that a quite essential area of development policy is stagnating.

Wittke: The Reagan government is refusing to pay its contributions to the World Bank on the agreed schedule. That just shows that Washington intends to use its development aid only as a reward for good behavior by individual states.

Offergolds: We have criticized that. The Americans are experiencing the problems of the North-South split in their own back yard right now with the illegal immigrants. This is going to intensify if the social situation continues to worsen so dramatically -- in Central America, for instance. We have to hope that this perception will spread in the United States and that it will have political consequences.

Wittke: I admit this: I'm worried that there are tendencies toward reducing substantially the payments promised by the United States.

Wittke: Should Bonn step into the breach?

Offergolds: That just won't be possible.

SPIEGEL: The United States is also blocking the North-South dialogue. U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig wants to negotiate only with individual Third World states. The U.S. philosophy holds that the developing countries will be better served by private investments than with government aid anyway.

Offergolds: The North-South dialogue has to resume following the conference in Mexico in October at the latest. The generalization that private investments are more important than government aid is inadmissible. Of course there are states in which private assistance can be very effective, but in the poorer developing countries a private transfer of capital and technology is possible only if government aid has paved the way for one or two decades.

Wittke: Now that the Reagan administration is on the scene, is there still a chance for a joint Western development policy, or will the Europeans have to go it alone with their Third World policy in the future?

Offergolds: There has always been a division of labor. The Europeans have always had an autonomous role in the dialogue between North and South. And it will be that way in the future as well.

Wittke: But now it looks as though the Americans want to play their own role and no longer want to consult with Europe.

Offergolds: Given everything for which the new American administration could be criticized, one thing cannot be disputed: It wants to enter into an open dialogue with us on all important issues. It is also prepared to put its own positions up for discussion and to come to agreement on them with us Europeans.

SPILLER: Doubts would seem to be in order.

Offergeld: The talks are already under way. I, too, am going to talk with the American administration about North-South policy.

SPILLER: And Hans-Dietrich Genscher has already adopted part of the new U.S. strategy. The foreign minister is calling on the developing countries to be more mindful of Western security interests. The Third World states are thus still to be pressured to repel the influence of the Soviets. Is future development policy to be only a foreign policy instrument against Soviet expansionist desires?

Offergeld: No. In no event will that happen. The foreign minister and I agree on that. In no event must North-South policy be allowed to degenerate into an instrument in the East-West conflict. This would mean preprogramming the failure of this policy. And the Third World states today will not let themselves be turned into pawns in the chess game between East and West. This has been made quite clear even in the case of a state like Saudi-Arabia.

SPILLER: Western development policy is being discredited because the United States is developing a predilection for rightwing dictatorships.

Offergeld: I have to put up with some things, but I'm sure that here as well the Americans will recognize their own interests very clearly and will translate them into policy. And that can mean only this: Where there are dictatorships, inequitable distribution of property and social conflicts, one has to work toward social equality and peaceful change. Social and peaceful change in the developing countries is just as important to our security as military balance is.

SPILLER: In the United States there is no appreciation at all for the fact that the Europeans also support countries like Angola or Ethiopia, which are considered by Washington to have communist governments.

Offergeld: The Americans cannot prevent us from doing what we think is right. The Federal Republic has its own role to play. After all, our importance and our economic strength are not so insignificant that we are unable to do something in many areas on our own. There has always been a sharing of tasks, and sometimes different viewpoints. This won't jeopardize our relationship with the Americans.

SPILLER: Perhaps the division of responsibilities goes like this: The Europeans supply the programs for social progress and the Americans supply the weapons?

Offergeld: No. Certainly not. That would be bad.

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C.R.: 3103/332



## DKP HOLDS CONGRESS, GIVES STANDS ON ISSUES

## Emphasis on Peace, Youth

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 30 May 81 p 4

[Article by Me: "Answering Young People's Vital Questions With Marx and Engels."]

[Text] Hanover, 29 May--In the opinion of the German Communist Party, which is loyal to Moscow, the question now being asked in Poland is: "Who--whom." Its chairman, Mies, explained at the party congress in Hanover that the "interests of peace also" demand that this question be decided in the spirit of socialism; what is at stake in Poland is power.

The DKP party leader focused his report on preventing the stationing of modern medium-range missiles in the Federal Republic; he considered this of utmost importance, and what was at stake was "to be or not to be."

Mies, who read out the report, accused the West German chancellor of having sacrificed Social Democratic peace policy on the Pentagon's sacrificial altar before his 'Canossa-flight' to the United States. He called for a people's antimissile coalition against the rulers' missile coalition and he expressed his esteem to the Social Democratic delegates who "raised their voice against further rearmament." Turning to the rest of the SPD, Mies said: "You after all helped bring about a turn from cold war to detente in the early 1970's. Should the claim of being a peace party now be abandoned and the SPD now become a party which supports the Federal Republic's further dangerous rearmament?"

The DKP has apparently not reached the goal of helping to collect, prior to the party congress, a total of 1 million signatures to the so-called Krefeld appeal against additional missile armament. Mies talked of only about 800,000 signatures that had been obtained by the middle of May. But he pointed with satisfaction to the numerous forces which supported this appeal with demonstrations, political and church events, peace weeks, forums and peace literature. "A dividing line has opened up between missile advocates and opponents. The altercation between these camps is characterized by an intensity and even a political dramatization unequalled in our land.

He listed four "demands for peace and security" which, "together with other peace-loving and realistically thinking forces," are advocated by the DKP: retraction



of the Federal government's agreement to the stationing of Pershing II and cruise missiles in the Federal Republic; immediate negotiation for the limitation and reduction of medium-range atomic weapons in Europe with a simultaneous moratorium on all additional stationings of this kind while negotiations are in progress; elimination of atomic, biological and chemical weapons from the territory of the Federal Republic as well as "not one additional mark for the Tornado program" and "no weapons for Chile, Turkey, Saudi-Arabia and other reactionary governments."

As is customary at DKP party congresses, the party chairman made known the number of members: 48,856. He gave the number of new recruits as 5,160; however, taking into consideration deaths, expulsions and resignations, the real increase since the last party congress 2 1/2 years ago was only 2,376. Mies gave the number of expulsions for 1980 only as 47, resignations for the same year as 156. Mies recommended that recruiting not be left merely to the party's operating groups but be engaged in by all party members, preferably in nonpolitical organizations: "The point is definitely to participate more and more systematically in associations and organizations which the working class has created for the realization of specific interests, in which they use some of their free time, engage in sports, and satisfy some of their cultural needs." At the same time, Mies rejected the ever more frequent accusation of planned communist infiltration of labor unions: "What does all this talk about infiltration of labor unions mean? The DKP in its struggle for workers' rights always marches together and side by side with labor union units. To do this, it does not put on 'infiltration boots' or felt house-slippers." The DKP's actions do not weaken, but rather strengthen, democratic movements.

Mies showed himself to be worried when he dealt in detail with his party's relationship to the Federal Republic's youth where "many new questions" have arisen: "Their encounters with us communists have become more demanding, both intellectually and in the sphere of practical politics, and even also more controversial and contradictory." Mies admitted that the young people's general distrust of parties and organizations does not stop with the DKP either: "Today they frequently see an unbridgeable contradiction between spontaneous and organized action. Such tendencies are purposefully introduced to young people, so as to block the entry to organized action, and especially the entry to Marxist organizations." Mies recommended that no ready answers and patent-prescriptions be offered to the youth, but demanded on the other hand that the proven teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin "as guideline for the answers to life's problems" not be sacrificed.

The DKP's ever worsening showing at all elections has led the party chairman to considerations regarding "an organized parliamentary union of various democratic and leftwing forces. This should be striven for first of all wherever the DKP and "the Greens" are already represented in community parliaments. Also conceivable are election agreements on the support of one allied partner's candidates in a community or city district by the other allied partner and vice versa. In such election alliances, the partners must agree on a mutual minimum program. Mies outlined such a program as follows: "We could for instance conceive of an actual election program which, without ifs and buts, takes a stand against the stationing of new U.S.-American atomic missiles, for negotiations on the reduction of atomic weapons East and West, the opposition to social dismantling and the extension of social rights, the breaking of sole representation demands by the Bonn parties, the achievement of more direct democracy, the rejection of Bon's atomic program, and due respect for the public's wishes on all important matters of community and state policies.

Yet, with this minimum program, the organizational, political and ideological independence of the partner must be preserved. No approval could be given to an election program "in which anticommunist positions are represented or which in the interest of ecological policies deemed erroneous by us, impugn on the living standard of working people."

#### Resolution on Poland

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 30 May 81 p 4

[Article by Me: "Position at the DKP Party Congress: 'Worried About the Situation in Poland!'"

[Text] Hanover, 29 May--In the presence of the Soviet Polit bureau member and party secretary for relations with sister parties, Ponomarev, as well as of the Soviet ambassador to the Federal Republic, Semenov, the chairman of the German Communist Party Expressed his views on the situation in Poland. The relevant paragraph in the DKP chairman's report reads as follows:

"When we express our unshakable faith in the successful progress of real-socialism, we do not overlook the complicated and critical condition which has emerged in People's Poland and which continues to worry us. When we hear voices from People's Poland defaming socialism and extolling the so-called 'free market economy,' when labor unions develop which are far removed from the tradition of the revolutionary workers' movement, which even brag that they can count on the support of anti-socialist forces from abroad--then it is clear to us: imperialist diversion centers and domestic counterrevolutionary forces have succeeded, by means of clever utilization of serious errors on the part of the Polish United Workers' Party, in putting People's Poland into a position which seriously threatens the socialist order. And this threat is in any case in no way diminished when--so it looks to us--recently more and more concessions have been made to antisocialist forces.

What is at stake in People's Poland is power. And it is our firm conviction: socialism in People's Poland can be successfully defended and stabilized only under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party which acts resolutely and militantly and which lets itself be guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism. We declare openly: the interests of the Polish working class and the Polish nation in general, of the entire socialist community of nations, of all progressive forces in the world, and also the interests of peace demand preemptorily that the threatening danger of counterrevolution be prevented, that the question who-whom be answered in the spirit of socialism. And our party, which feels itself tied in solidarity and friendship to the Polish people, stands without any ifs or buts on the side of Poland's workers and communists which defend the socialist cause, and can thereby rely fully on their friends and allies."

9011

CSO: 3103/323

## CHAIRMAN SUOMINEN STRENGTHENS POSITION AT CONSERVATIVES CONGRESS

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 22 May 81 p 28-21

[Article by Juhani Aromaki: "Smiling Ilkka and the Reluctant Man"]

[Text] At the Coalition party congress, everything was already clear from the beginning, but this was an important meeting for Chairman Ilkka Suominen. He had, of course, once been sent there as a relatively unknown man, selected by Harri Holkeri, as a test.

Now he had been chosen, unanimously, by the whole party.

In the opinion of chairman Ilkka Suominen, it didn't matter much whether he had had as his opponent the fighting Pentti Maki-Hakola of Pohjanmaa, for example, or not. The chairman considered this a "nuance question."

The Coalition itself will have to evaluate how big a question it is, whether one man or a group around him tries either clearly or unclearly to sabotage things, sometimes purely on questions of domestic affairs, sometimes slipping into the area of foreign policy.

The young people encouraged the man from Pohjanmaa to run, so that people could see the true weight of the support that had gathered around the opposition's man.

Pentti Maki-Hakola asked if criticizing the party leadership would be understood as announcing oneself as an opposition candidate.

Maki-Hakola asked, "Does the Coalition really want to end all discussion?"

It was an appropriate question. The tactical disease of Finnish politics, by which the considered differences of opinion of certain individuals are immediately condemned, seems to have spread somewhat to the Coalition.

In its extreme form, this means that if Pentti Maki-Hakola or one of his supporters were to be critical on some questions of the law about gravel, for example, it would be silly to accuse him of opposing Finland's foreign policy.

Pentti Maki-Hakola's speeches stood out in the present Coalition meeting, and they were perhaps too pronounced besides. But the man lost his head a little, and did not succeed this time in getting groups onto his side as well as sometimes earlier.

Pentti Maki-Hakola also lost at least one of his "sympathizers" in this meeting. Member of Parliament Jalmari Torikka, who according to his own words has been classified as belonging to the party's right wing, disassociated himself from the foreign-policy exaggerations of this group.

He even proposed that if a Coalition party member does not follow the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line and the decisions of the party congress in general, the party has a responsibility to intervene immediately.

#### Young Voices

The young people of the Coalition kept the meeting alive. Even though they didn't succeed in changing the method of selecting vice-chairmen in hopes of getting their own candidate elected, they achieved many other things.

Unprejudiced speeches about development aid, a new international economic system, the necessity of continuing political tourism--in spite of scoffers--or giving priority in practice to children, families, and the environment, made the "old people" think.

"Life and children should be more important to us than rocks and pine trees," said a young man, and he received the most unreserved applause on Sunday afternoon.

A young person from Espoo proposed that the party consider the relationship between the developing countries and Finland, which is like a godfather system, and which he himself said has been called the "domestic negro system."

Someone suggested to the party leadership and others joining the "percentage" movement. One young person stressed the power of culture--not just of the elite--on both people and political movements, and he aroused more interest among the people.

The young people also spoke on behalf of the developing areas and of the development of regional equality in front of the very "urbanized" party leadership. All in all, the young people and the older people who are thinking about the future have broadly and genuinely the same direction of thinking in all parties.

#### Tender Spots

The meeting was an important success for Ilkka Suominen. He now has at last--if he didn't have before--the "show" years behind him. When he became chairman, this man Harri Holkeri was a relatively unknown factor to the great public. He had worked in Nakkila as an office manager, and had not even been a member of Parliament at the time of his election.

Now Ilkka Suominen received the unwavering support of the meeting. The meeting was, in addition, pure in its foreign-policy discussions, and Finland's foreign policy was not attacked from any side. Pentti Maki-Hakola's speech on domestic policy was just a test of the ability of the party leadership, which wanted harmony, to withstand criticism.



Ilkka Suominen, as also the entire party leadership, received flattering praise from the people at the meeting. Tapani Mottinen was even a little ashamed when he heard the praise and regretted that "the wife wasn't here to listen."

The chairman received some mild "hair-pulling" for that gravel affair and for his speech about the Christians. He had pounded the gravel shortly before on the Christians and given to understand that they were untrustworthy in foreign policy. And Ilkka Suominen did not blame his speeches on newspapermen, as was the general custom of the younger generation.

He admitted that he had made a mistake and that the Coalition people would truly not stand for it. The chairman of course observed that he "hadn't beaten them with as big a club as Kari had portrayed him with in the HELSINGIN SANOMAT."

Now Ilkka Suominen talked about foreign policy, which 10 years ago, for example, one would not have expected to hear from the mouth of a Coalition leader. He recommended extension of the YYA [Mutual Understanding and Aid] treaty already now, even though it runs until 1990.

"The YYA treaty removes doubts about Finland's behavior in various international situations and thus it stabilizes the position of our country and of all of Northern Europe.

"Because of this, the period of validity of the YYA treaty should be continued in good time before the end of the decade, preferably already before the weapons-system reinforcements scheduled for Europe are made, or as we hope, before the super-power negotiations that are making the additional weapons systems necessary," said Ilkka Suominen, and thus he joined Chairman Kalevi Sorsa of the Social Democratic party, among others, in the idea of extending the YYA treaty in the near future already.

Mauno Koivisto and Yli-Vainio

The Coalition's delegation in Parliament has been a "breath-stoppingly" surprising working partner for the party leadership. The party congress went smoothly, the presidential matter was also postponed, as delegation leader Pentti Sillantausta thought it wise to just about put an equals sign between Mauno Koivisto and Niilo Yli-Vainio.

Ilkka Suominen made the only prepared speech about the presidential question, since the proposals of the Coalition members from Artjärvi were so inflexible that not a single speech was made about them.

The chairman emphasized the necessity of caring for foreign policy in the president's work. The Coalition will be preparing in its 1982 and 1983 meetings for the election of presidential electors in 1984.

"I want to encourage all parts of our organization and every Coalition member in preparing for the election of electors in 1984 to work purposefully to secure an active and peace-seeking policy of neutrality according to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line and to strengthen its basis."



Immediately after this, the chairman said that the Coalition would support activities to improve conditions for economic and industrial cooperation.

#### Free or Market Economy?

The Coalition has had small problems throughout the winter, because the party congress did not seem to have sufficient material to discuss. This appeared in the meeting itself, even though one might ask whether choosing a party leadership and approving a program of principles were not sufficiently great matters.

The program of principles had been undergoing organizational work for a year, and no further changes were made except a few commas and periods. When Ilkka Suominen began the debate, his speech was a summary of the whole program.

The Coalition has, at least in words, spread itself out like an umbrella over its traditional border areas. According to the program, the shadow of the Coalition extends over the political center, with its small and somewhat larger parties, and it even covers a rather big segment of the Social Democratic Party. At least the choice of words in the program is that tolerant and broad-minded.

"The Coalition respects the freedom, rights, and convictions of others, and it shows compassion for other people, for society, and for the whole human race. The ultimate task of society is to make sure that no one person's success is based on the use of other people or on the limitation of their possibilities or freedoms," said Ilkka Suominen.

One who knows Marx's works well can judge how near or far these words are from one another. Even though the term "social free economy" has been found for over 10 years in Coalition documents, for the majority of its supporters the term is undefined.

One delegate even marched up to the podium and demanded that this difficult-to-explain term be changed to "market economy." The chairman rushed to reply after this speech and appealed strongly for keeping social free economy in the documents.

"Social free economy is based on market economy, but it takes into account the ethical viewpoints that affect economic activities in today's society," the chairman said.

'The economy is not the only goal, but it is one means among many. Anyone who wants to understand this term, will certainly understand that," he added.

The meeting said that it understood by approving the matter unanimously.

#### What Kind of Coalition Member?

Now that the series of party congresses has begun, the people will have a good time watching the first two rows of seats. They are, of course, usually reserved for the party leadership, but so many other people are attracted there. This time as well, the interest of some people in television and other cameras was so great that commercial television will certainly not be without its news anchors.

The time of the meeting was disturbing to farmers, because not everyone could do what Tapani Murttinen did: sow turnip seeds at five in the morning and then go to the meeting and get elected. No motion was made to change the time, but some improvement is expected.

What is a Coalition Member Like in 1981?

He carries out the jointly approved Coalition party line.

He is a builder, defender, and developer of Finnish society, not an opponent and obstructionist of positive development.

To him, social awareness means patriotism, a desire to participate in the development of society, and respect for other nations.

The goal of his party for today and the future is to actively support Finland's security policy and thus the preservation of national independence.

He supports the active, peace-seeking policy of neutrality known as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.

He respects differences among people.

He considers the promotion of individuality, sociality, creativity, tolerance, activity, criticism, and idealism to be valuable goals for education.

He values the system of values based on Christianity.

According to his concept, part of man's intellectual growth is abandoning selfishness and the attempt to subjugate others.

A Coalition member honors the freedom, rights, and convictions of others.

In his work on behalf of Finland, he respects the existence of all parties and other groups that are for peaceful reforms and developments, and he works with them on the basis of mutual equality.

Ilkka Suominen said that these statements did not include anything new to be heard. And he meant it too, but the Coalition members underwrote these descriptions with the most enthusiastic applause.

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## SOCIALIST CONGRESS WEIGHS CONTINUED COALITION CHOICES

## SDP Presidential Candidate Seen

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Jun 81 p 7

[Article: "SDP Looking for Social Democratic Candidate for Forthcoming Presidential Elections"]

[Text] The Social Democratic Party will be nominating its own social democratic candidate for the forthcoming presidential elections if the Social Democratic Party congress, which commences on Wednesday in Pori, approves the platform prepared by the party leadership.

The SDP's party council will make a decision on the SDP's candidate later. Party Secretary Ulf Sundqvist, who presented the SDP's plans for its congress on Monday, surmised that a suitable time for making a decision on a particular individual will probably be the first part of next year.

In Sundqvist's opinion the Social Democrats do not have reason to avoid or stop a presidential discussion at the party congress. However, according to him it is not yet time for drawing a conclusion.

At the present time the social democratic presidential candidate seems to be Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto, who as far as is known will also be speaking at the congress. In addition to this, he will also be acting as an expert in the party's committee on international affairs together with Chairman Kalevi Sorsa.

According to the presidential position prepared for the congress the SDP has supported President Urho Kekkonen's foreign policy. "President Kekkonen has firmly established the basic line of our country's active, peaceful policy of neutrality. As a result of this basic line our country's position is stable and independent of changes in the international situation," states the position paper.

SDP: The presidential position is based on our own candidate in the elections, but it does not preclude the possibility that President Kekkonen's term of office could for some reason be extended. In 1978 the SDP's candidate was Doctor Kekkonen.

## Broad Base of Cooperation for Government Policy

In the section concerning government policy in the domestic policy statement

the SDP abandoned the old position according to which a broad based government of workers' parties and the center is the best guarantee for the continuity of our foreign policy and for a long-term reform policy.

Now the SDP announces that "a stable and controlled economic development and the continuation of reform work are made possible only by means of a broad cooperation among the political parties".

Party Secretary Sundqvist, who presented the draft of the SDP's platform, emphasized that current cooperation between the left and the center continues to be a suitable base for government cooperation assuming that an ideological content can be infused into the work instead of tactics and power plays.

Sundqvist longed for a bourgeois liberalism and desire for reform from the center. Party Secretary Sundqvist, who will be resigning his position at the congress, mentioned constitutional reform as an example.

According to Sundqvist the SDP does not want to tie itself down to any position ahead of time and, therefore, the broad based cooperation has been adopted in the party platform instead of a more narrow cooperation of just the left and the center.

Sundqvist emphasized that the SDP does not want to exclude any government alternative. However, Sundqvist did not consider government cooperation between the Conservative Party and the Social Democrats to be feasible since these parties represent each other's main alternative.

#### Funds to be Discussed

The party leadership will also present a proposal on enterprise wage funds, which are being called cooperative funds, for discussion by the party congress. According to the Social Democrats they would be enterprise oriented and they would concern the large enterprises. In the opinion of the SDP small and medium-sized enterprises should be given the opportunity to join the system.

What is meant by the funds is a system by which wage earners would receive an opportunity to own shares in an enterprise and participate in its affairs by giving up wage increases.

Reductions in public services are condemned in the SDP's domestic policy statement. In the opinion of the SDP the reduction of state and local services would favor the rich and would be disastrous to those who are in lower income brackets.

In taxation the Social Democrats want to treat capital income and enterprise income in the same manner as wage income. The SDP is proposing that the wage tax system be changed in such a way that the marginal tax of middle income people would be made lower. In the opinion of the SDP a transition should be made from the taxation of profits to the taxation of power resources in corporate taxation.

In the opinion of the SDP child subsidies should also be paid for 16 and 17 year olds.

In agricultural policy the SDP considers the more open negotiating procedures to be a failure. In environmental policy it is demanding the establishment of an environmental ministry.

According to Party Secretary Sundqvist the Social Democrats are preparing for a period of slower economic growth in their program work. According to him the discussion on a program of principles is also aimed at this.

The intent of this party congress is to begin reform work on the program of principles that has been in effect since 1952. Sundqvist noted that the program no longer corresponds with present-day society in all respects.

He saw deficiencies in, among other things, the analysis of the international situation, the evaluation of economic development, and in questions concerning the environment and energy.

However, Sundqvist emphasized that aiming toward a slower growth does not mean that the Social Democrats are abandoning the principle of economic growth, since "it is only through economic growth that the SDP can achieve its goal of an equitable distribution of income".

#### Old Leadership, New Secretary

The SDP congress will also be electing new leaders for the country's largest party for the next 3 years. The congress will be electing former leaders Kalevi Sorsa, Veikko Helle, and Pirkko Tyolajarvi.

However, there will be an election between MP Erkki Liikanen and First Secretary Marianne Laxen of the Social Democratic Women's League for the position of party secretary.

Liikanen is an early favorite since a decision to support him has been made by congress representatives from eight social democratic districts. Laxen is being supported by one district, the Swedish Workers League, and the party's youth league.

The representatives of six districts, which will subsequently decide the election, have presented a formulation of their position to the congress. Sundqvist, who is resigning from the position of party secretary, did not feel offended on Monday even if the party should elect a new secretary.

According to social democratic sources it is still possible that even a third candidate may appear for the position of party secretary. One possibility mentioned in preliminary discussions is the current personnel director of the Workers Savings Bank, former MP Matti Louekoski.

#### Center Distracts By Threat

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 Jun 81 p 9

[Article by Aarno Laitinen and Janne Virkkunen: "Koivisto Irritated With Center Party's Antics"]

[Text] On Thursday Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto accused his ruling partner, the Center Party, of political antics and an unstable policy.



At the SDP congress, which has been continuing in Pori, Koivisto answered the Center Party's threat to pull its ministers out of the government unless the territorial law and pension reform are handled in accordance with the party's desires.

It became evident from Prime Minister's Koivisto's speech to the congress that the Center Party's behavior is not understood in the SDP. Koivisto was astonished at the territorial law controversy because the bill before the Diet corresponds more closely with social democratic views than the current legislation.

"Now an attempt is being made to make this issue a government question in a manner that infers we are supposedly opposed to it and the Center Party is for it," stated Koivisto.

In the opinion of the Prime Minister the Social Democrats cannot take government cooperation just as lightly as the Center Party. "Fortunately, not one of us has the authority to conduct ourselves in such an unstable manner," stated Koivisto and believes that the reason for the current crisis will disappear by the beginning of next week.

In talking about the consequences of a Center Party provocation the Prime Minister warned that "if we are provoked, it is better to try to remain unprovoked."

#### The Center Party Remains Unchanged

Koivisto described the Center Party's behavior with an old joke in which one elderly woman tells another that when she married she told her husband that the drinking and smoking must stop now.

The other asked how it went and the woman answered: I do not know since I never saw him again.

The Prime Minister also considered the Center Party to be a difficult partner in agricultural policy. In Koivisto's opinion it is, on the other hand, possible to negotiate with the Agricultural Producers Association, but "a discussion is nearly impossible at the political level."

In addition to agricultural policy, problems connected with next year's budget are sneaking up on the government. Of these problems the Prime Minister mentioned the continuation of the sales tax alleviation for industry, about which views have been and apparently will be contradictory.

Koivisto warned against transferring the cost of development aid increases to the future generations. If development aid is granted and the country goes into debt at the same time, this means that within the country the burden will be transferred to future generations and even under the best of conditions this debt will have to be paid in future years.

### Important Figure at Congress

Even though Prime Minister Koivisto does not have a formal position in the organization of the SDP, he is without a doubt the most important figure at this congress. Koivisto's actions are followed closely and he has so far closely observed the work of the congress including the pallid political discussion.

Koivisto always receives much applause from the congress when he speaks and whenever a speaker mentions Koivisto as president or as a presidential candidate, the congress breaks out in applause.

It is even impossible to imagine that the Social Democratic Party would seriously consider anyone other than Mauno Koivisto as a presidential candidate. Therefore, he is widely admired and honored among the party rank and file.

Even the party leaders are beginning to admit that the matter of Koivisto as a presidential candidate is beginning to become self-evident. Only the formal naming of the candidate will be postponed until next year.

Faithful to custom, Koivisto is, however, keeping his distance from the party rank and file. He can walk about the corridors of the Riihiketo School, the site of the congress, without enthusiastic representatives pulling on his sleeves and engaging him in discussion.

Those participating in the political discussion at the congress were clearly satisfied with the election successes of the French Socialists. Satisfaction was evident when the representative of the French Socialist Party, Yves Durand, was greeted with wild applause at the congress.

### "Mauno to Become Finland's Mitterrand"

Director Jukka Gustafsson of the Murikka Training Center of the Metal Workers Union drew the closest parallel between the events in France and Finland and promised to lead a large group of people to the public square in Tampere when Finland's Mauno assumes the leadership of the Finnish people.

Along with many others, Gustafsson was of the opinion that Koivisto has in recent years increased support for the party.

A certain kind of weariness with the party's adopted role as administrator of the state in government policies prevailed at this party congress.

An example of this weariness was presented on Thursday by MP Liisa Jaakonsaari of Oulu, who urged the party to prepare for presenting a social democratic alternative from a position of opposition during a bourgeois-majority Diet.

Jaakonsaari, who numbers among the leftwing members of the Diet faction, hoped that the Social Democrats and Communists would together consider the directions in which their policies are going.

"Do we want Finland to be a plastic-Finland with respect to its standard of living

or an ecologically balanced society in which a clean and healthy environment, reasonable work, meaningful human relations, and real possibilities for the individual to influence the decision making process are considered to be valuable in addition to sufficient security with respect to one's livelihood," asked Jaakon-Saari.

#### No Interest in the Conservative Party

Not one single representative to the congress participating in the political discussion demanded government cooperation between the Conservative Party and the Social Democrats.

In principle the speakers were also satisfied with the fact that in the public statements made by the party leadership the formulation of the point concerning government cooperation is very broad. In it there is only mention of a broad cooperation and no longer of a government cooperation of the left and the center as the best alternative.

In any event, this broad cooperation will arouse discussion since, among others, Heikki Koski, the future director of Alko [State Liquour Monopoly], announced that he is of the opinion that the point concerning government cooperation should be more precisely defined. It is expected that the domestic policy resolution will be approved on Saturday.

SDP Diet Faction Chairman Matti Ahde, who spoke at Thursday's discussion, demanded that the emphasis of economic policy be placed on full employment, the achievement of which he considers possible as long as an attempt is made.

Ahde criticized rightwing policy and demanded that tax policies be revised and announced that there is more reason than ever before to take a negative attitude toward the value added tax and the sales tax exemption on investments.

#### Liikanen Elected Party Secretary

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 Jun 81 p 9

[Article by Aarno Laitinen and Janne Virkkunen: "New Party Secretary Will Not Become a Minister"]

[Text] The Social Democrats' new party secretary, Erkki Liikanen, promises to reject all requests to become a minister and intends to devote the next 3 years to directing the party office. The two previous party secretaries, Ulf Sundqvist and Kalevi Sorsa, spent a great deal of their party secretary terms as ministers.

The outcome of the Social Democrats' party secretary elections was self-evident beforehand when on the previous night Chairman Kalevi Sorsa announced that his candidate for party secretary is Erkki Liikanen. Then it only became a question of the number of votes by which Liikanen would win over Marianne Laxen.

In the voting, Liikanen received 226 votes, Laxen 139. There were two abstentions.

The election was followed by the customary applause and expressions of congratulations, during which Liikanen, who had memorized his speech, found it difficult to hide his emotions. The defeated candidate Laxen had memorized her own speech even better than Liikanen and in conclusion proposed Nils Ferlin's song to the victor "Far jag lamna nagra blommor, nagra rosor i din vard..."

It is with this same song that Vaino Leskinen charmed Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir during her visit to Finland.

The whole party leadership and Laxen praised the competition for party secretary in a democratic manner. There were no signs that the defeated side was dissatisfied with the election results.

Party Secretary Liikanen stated that he has announced to the party leadership that he will not be available for a ministry post for the next 3 years. Liikanen intends to devote all his time to the office of party secretary. Former Party Secretary Ulf Sundqvist was a minister for most of his term in office even though he was presented with the condition that his job is in the party office.

#### Chairmen Elected Unanimously

As expected the Social Democrats' three chairmen were elected unanimously even though there was also a proposal before the election committee to elect Matti Ahde as a vice chairman in place of Veikko Helle. Ahde turned down the nomination.

Taisto Kalevi Sorsa, 50, who was elected as chairman, was the party secretary from 1969 and chairman from 1975. Sorsa has completed secondary school, defended a dissertation for his candidacy in social science, and before his career in the party he worked as a journalist, a UNESCO official in Paris, and as an assistant section chief in the Ministry of Education. In the 1970's Sorsa held the office of prime minister for longest duration in two governments. In addition to this, he was foreign minister in two governments.

Vice Chairman Veikko Kullervo Helle, 69, has primarily followed his father's footsteps: they were both carpenters and MP's. Helle has been vice chairman of the SDP since 1972. He has sat on the party committee since 1957 and in the Diet since 1951. Helle has been a minister three times. Presently he is the first vice chairman of the Diet.

Piirko Tyolajarvi, 42, continues her third term as second vice chairman. Tyolajarvi, who has a masters degree in commerce, has in recent years also served on the Standard Equipment Board. In the beginning of July she will become the first woman minister of trade and industry in Finnish history. Tyolajarvi has been in the Diet since 1972.

Erkki Liikanen, 30, who was elected party secretary, learned about political life as chairman of the Teenage League in 1971 and he has served in the Diet's wage committee since 1972. When not involved in Diet work he studied to become a candidate of political science and served in the army.

The election committee, which accepted Liikanen as a candidate for party secretary



by a vote of nine to six, praised his manner of dealing with state and international affairs, his ability to make personal contacts as well as the quality of his organizational work, consistency, and speed. Liikanen, who is from Mikkeli, intends to continue commuting between two homes. Weekdays in Helsinki and weekends with his family in Mikkeli.

#### A Forgotten Sundqvist

One of the most forgotten individuals at the congress was Party Secretary Ulf Sundqvist, 36, who will resign his post of minister of trade and industry in July and will transfer to the Workers Savings Bank to learn the tasks of director, for which he will assume responsibility next February. Sundqvist was not one of those presented with flowers, he was not praised for his meritorious work as party secretary, and he was not given a position of consolation either in the party committee or in the chairmanship of the party council.

This has happened many times before. It is a waste of time to look for wall in the party office on which portraits of former chairmen and party secretaries are mounted. One of the reasons is that some of the former leaders have moved into the wrong camp, have represented an unorthodox direction, or have otherwise collided with those in power.

Of the leaders who have been left by the wayside in the last 25 years only Rafael Paasio enjoys the approval of the party leadership. Chairman Emil Skog of the 1950's ended up in the TPSL (Workers and Small Holders Social Democratic League) camp as a result of a split within the party, in addition to distrust concerning foreign policy Vaino Tanner received a rightwing label, and party secretaries Vaino Leskinen, Kaarlo Pitsinki, Erkki Raatikainen have each in turn fallen in disfavor of the party leadership. It is also doubtful that Party Secretary Ulf Sundqvist will be among those party secretaries whose portrait will be hung on the walls of the party office.

#### Koikkalainen's Position Was Shaky

Present Interior Minister Johannes Koikkalainen was reelected unanimously as chairman of the Social Democratic Party Council even though his position vacillated seriously at one point.

Sundqvist, Chairman Riitta Prusti of the Industrial Employees Union as well as Erkki Vasama from Jyväskylä aspired to Koikkalainen's position.

However, they did not have sufficient support, and when Veikko Helle announced that he would keep his position as vice chairman and would not become a candidate to the Council, Koikkalainen was able to continue another term.

Vilho Halme from Tampere and Kerttu Piispa from Kymi were elected as vice chairmen of the Party Council. Piispa's election was unanimous. Halme won a very close victory over Esko Ojala from Lapland. The vote was 186 to 181. The Social Democratic Party congress will continue today with elections to the Party Committee.

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## SAARINEN'S COMMUNISM COMPARED WITH THAT OF CPSU, CCP

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 22 May 81 p 62-64

[Article by Sakari Virkkunen: "Three Faces of Communism"]

[Text] There are significant differences in the attitude of the Communist parties of Finland, the Soviet Union, and China on current questions. The following comparison of attitudes is more a summary than precise, but it may still give a general picture of the situation.

	Finland (majority of the SKP)	Soviet Union	China
Ideology	Marxist-Leninist (features of Eurocommunism)	Marxist-Leninist	Leninist-Maoist (with reservations about Maoism)
Concept of the nature of socialist society	Marxist-Leninist People's Democracy	Nation of all the people	Proletarian dictatorship
Continuation of class conflicts in socialism	denies	denies	admits, but belittles
When will it achieve socialism	not in the near future	soon	after a long period of time
Attitude on religion	negative	negative	negative (but "wrong ideas will not dis- appear by force but by enlightenment")
Attitude on pre- vailing social morality	to be undermined	to be preserved	to be preserved

	Finland (majority of the SKP)	Soviet Union	China
Attitude on exchange of information between peoples of the east and west	free, but following the position of the socialist countries	selective	selective
Attitude on so-called peace defenders	positive	positive	negative (sees the movement as Soviet controlled)
Attitude on conscientious objectors	positive	negative (supports objectors from NATO armies)	negative
Attitude on own country's defense forces	negative	positive	positive
Attitude on UN peace-keeping forces	reserved	positive	negative
Attitude on war	depends on the war	depends on the war	depends on the war
Attitude on international weapons trade	contradictory	positive (sells some itself)	negative (makes gifts)
Attitude on foreign military bases	depends on country	negative (except for its own bases)	negative
Attitude on Soviet invasion of Hungary, 1956	mixed at first, then positive	positive	negative
Attitude on Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968	negative (rebels positive)	positive	negative
Attitude on Cuban wars in Africa	positive	supporting	negative

	Finland (majority of the SKP)	Soviet Union	China
Attitude on Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and Laos	positive	positive	positive
Attitude on Chinese invasion of Vietnam	negative	negative	positive
Attitude on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan	positive	positive	negative
Attitude on Poland's Solidarity trade union	unclear	negative	positive
Attitude on independent trade unions in own country	negative	negative	negative
Attitude on workers' self-government (Yugoslavian model, relevant also in Poland)	unclear	negative	negative
Attitude on Eurocommunism	positive	negative	more positive than before
Attitude on many-party system	positive	negative	negative
Attitude on increased trade with capitalist countries	negative, with some reservations	positive	positive
Attitude on trade with USA	positive (?)	positive	positive
Attitude on trade with Chile	negative	negative	positive

	Finland (majority of the SKP)	Soviet Union	China
Attitude on foreign loans	positive with reservations	positive	positive
Attitude on de- velopment aid for other countries	positive	positive	positive
Attitude on nuclear power plants	positive	positive	positive
Attitude on financial incen- tives in eco- nomic life	negative	positive	positive
Attitude on political cri- ticism from below	positive	negative	reserved
Attitude on Stalinism	conflicting (mino- rity Stalinist)	positive	differentiated (70% good, 30% bad)
Attitude on use of nuclear weapons	negative	negative	negative
Attitude on total ban on nuclear weapons	unclear	negative (?)	negative
Attitude on neutron bomb	negative	negative	positive
Attitude on nuclear-free zone for Scandi- navia	positive	positive	reserved (Soviet Union's nuclear wea- pons also to be restricted)

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## BRIEFS

SOVIETS LAUD SINISALO'S BOOK--The book "The Answer is Minority Policy," that appeared last winter by Taisto Sinisalo, leader of the Communists' minority wing, has received a praising review in the Soviet Union's most important publication dealing with ideological questions. The magazine KOMMUNIST calls Sinisalo's book a study. In the article it is said that there have appeared very few studies on this subject since V. I. Lenin's collected works appeared. "Taisto Sinisalo's work fills this gap in an essential way," writes the author of the review, J. Ambartsumov. The review, which is totally flattering, was made interesting by the fact that it appeared just in time before the meeting of delegates of the SKP [Communist Party of Finland]. "Taisto Sinisalo pays special attention to the internal life of the party and the problem of its complete integrity," writes Ambartsumov. "Anyone can have any attitude he wishes toward the author's political opinions, but one thing is clear, namely that the book leaves no room for doubt of his deep interest in strengthening the unity of the SKP and overcoming the danger of a split." Ambartsumov indeed says of the positions taken by Sinisalo that "real Communists for whom factionism is strange have just these attitudes." [Text] [Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 21 May 81 p 9] 9611

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## STRONG MARXIST PRESENCE IN SOCIALIST PARTY LEADERSHIP NOTED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 3 Jun 81 pp 1, 8

[Article by Annie Kriegel]

[Text] On the one hand, people emphasize the large number of moderate ministers in the Mauroy government, the fact that they belong to a very "centrist" center left like Maurice Faure or to very "rightist" factions within the PS like Chandernagor or Delors, or even the fact that by nature and essence they are "sweethearts" like Mauroy himself.

On the other hand, there is an emphasis on the threat that could be posed by the entry of communist ministers into the new government that is to be formed after the left wins again in the legislative elections.

People on both sides appear to be forgetting what is actually the case: the active presence, here and now, of Marxism and Marxists in the PS and the socialist government.

The presence of Marxism? There is first of all, in a rather diffuse state, a sort of common compost or primary residue of Marxism, a Marxism of Guesde the essence of which is a vision of society reduced to a class struggle. One finds a reflection of that kind of Marxism, hammered into the socio-economic infrastructure, in Francois Mitterrand's inaugural address, when the brand new president of all the French people felt compelled to observe that "the political majority in France...has now identified itself with the social majority.

One finds another reflection when a socialist candidate in the legislative elections, a minister to boot, claims that "at Chartres it will be a battle between the banker's daughter and the son of a chimneysweep." Still, one should not forget that the most abominable massacres of the 20th century, those which left tens of millions of victims in the USSR, in China, and elsewhere, far surpassing purely racial massacres (even today!), were committed against those who, in the familiar expression, "were not well-born."

It is this Marxism and its questionable simplicity that remains at the bottom of an economic policy of recovery through demand--a sort of categorical imperative which time after time leads each successive socialist experiment into the same catastrophic bind.

Embedded in this residual compost, but developing independently, a second Marxist sprout is springing up, one that is more Marxist-Leninist. A classic, orthodox Leninism, the central theme of which is precisely what distinguishes Marxism and Leninism: the theme of imperialism (naturally embodied only in American imperialism).

J.-P. Chevenement and the partisans of CERES [Socialist Center for Studies, Research and Education] in generation are thus continuing the tradition by which for 60 years the left wings of socialist parties have borrowed their theory, strategy, and policy from their communist neighbors. Anti-European, nationalistic, pro-industrial, statist, and centralist, the rhetoric of the new minister of research is hard to distinguish from that of a pre-Eurocommunism communist, and it was quite to be expected that the first socialist organization to invite a PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] representative to one of its occasions was the Federation of Paris, which at the time was in the pro-CERES camp. Leninists outside of Leninism, and moreover familiar only with its outward aspects, the CERES people are often sectarian in their field of expertise. This is the case for example with a Mexandeau temporarily settled in PTT [Posts and Telecommunications] in hopes of eventually getting a ministry, and with a Savary, too personally reserved to cultivate extremes.

As nothing in the PS is simple, Pierre Joxe, even though because of loyalty or some quite different reason he has remained close to Francois Mitterrand, is cultivating the same type of left socialism--with several variations: nothing surprising about seeing him put in charge of the nationalization of industries and banks, a subject which most clearly unites on the same equivocal platform both syndicalists who are fond of a certain type of economic rationality and communists who see in the nationalization nothing but a means of destroying the autonomy of the economic field in relation to the political field.

Consequently, Joxe is of particular interest to the CGT [General Confederation of Labor]: was he not the one who proposed Laroze as PS representative to the confederation's governing body, that same Laroze who then went over bags and baggage to the PCF and who was sent by the CGT to Afghanistan to bear witness that everything was normal and the labor union movement doing just fine?

### The Third World Sprout

But another Marxist sprout, also a Marxist-Leninist one, but Leninism of the height of the Brezhnev era, is already surging ahead of its two predecessors: this is the Third World sprout, of which the Marxist Christians are the special mediators. A sprout the tendrils of which wind through all socialist currents: one finds perched there people as different as Jospin, the first secretary of the party, Fournier, the deputy secretary general of the Elysee, a Rocard, or Rocardians such as J.-P. Cot.

This Third World-ism does not shrink from holding out Qadhafafi as a symbol of Pan-Arabism, especially since in the past the Libyan colonel had the foresight not to differentiate between socialists and communists when he was trying to seduce the French left. This Third World-ism accepts the idea, exceptionally supportive of communist encroachment in Africa, that there is still only one Africa--that one cannot distinguish between a moderate Africa and a Soviet-camp Africa, that Tananarive, Maputo, Libreville, and Luanda are the capitals of nonaligned countries that are perfectly capable of working with other countries to build a nonaligned Africa.

This Third World-ism, finally, because the international communist movement definitively brought it into its orbit in the 1960's, is happily yoked to a leftist ecologism born in the May 1968 tremors which is still inexorably following the same bent: that of structural disaggregation of the fabric of society. This is in fact a classic marriage: when any communist regime is being established, there is a period of alliance with anarchism; because anarchism (especially when it has a Christian tinge) is an acid that attacks and dissolves the web of society with exceptional vigor.

#### Communist "Penetration"

There remains a final question which I broach here with all the gravity and caution the subject requires. All the socialist parties have been the object of attempts at "penetration" on the part of the communist movement. So long as they are in the opposition, that is their own business. When by virtue of the decision of the voters they are legitimately put in charge of public affairs, it becomes an affair of state. I wish to make myself clearly understood: no one is asking the PS to unleash an internal witchhunt, but one might ask it to reflect on this continuing phenomenon and put it in its proper place. The communist "submarines" in the PS did not necessarily come from the local communist party and are not necessarily under the latter's control; most often they are in the service of the international communist apparatus. It was not the German PC that put Guillaume next to Chancellor Brandt.

Simon Malley took pleasure in disclosing that all he needed was one telephone call "to a friend who is now in the Elysee" to get permission to return to France. But there is really nothing mysterious or ambiguous about his allegiance, except for those who have decided once and for all to take the scantily disguised wolves of Soviet Third World policy for Third World sheep.

For good measure, we note that this very week saw the arrival of Mr Croissant, who has done more than act as the attorney for the accused members of the "Baader gang." Mr Croissant has been taken onto the staff of Mr Jacques Verges, who after winning fame 20 years ago in his defense of the Algerian nationalizations, after having briefly been established in Ben Bella's Algeria, was for a lengthy period kept away from the French scene, and no one knew exactly where this man, the brother of Paul Verges, the secretary of the Reunion PC, had gone.

Instead of floating capital, Paris these days is attracting floating revolutionaries. Just like Santiago (Chile) or Lisbon once did...

9516

CSO: 3100/772

## POLL SHOWS MOST PREFER NONSOCIALIST GOVERNMENT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 May 81 p 3

[Text] A majority of those who venture to predict the outcome of the fall Storting election believe we will have a new government made up of non-socialist parties. Most of those who take a stand also prefer such a change of government. Four out of 10 persons believe, however, that the election campaign will have greater significance for the outcome of the election than in earlier elections.

These are some of the chief results of an opinion poll that Norwegian Market Data carried out in the period 16 March to 10 April.

The survey was taken by personal interviews among a nationwide sampling of women and men over 18 years old, totaling about 1,300 persons.

Question 1: "Do you believe that after the election in the fall we shall still have a government coming from the Labor Party, or do you believe we shall get a new government of non-socialist parties?"

	All Interviewed %	Men %	Women %	Under 30 %	30-59 %	60 & Over %
Continued Labor gov't	34	30	38	32	35	35
New non-socialist gov't	45	55	35	48	46	40
Do not know	21	15	27	20	19	25
Total percent	100	100	100	100	100	100

Question 2: "And which result do you prefer, continued Labor Party government or a change of government?"

	All Interviewed %	men %	Women %	Under 30 %	30-59 %	60 & Over %
Continued Labor gov't	38	38	37	33	38	42
Change of government	48	52	44	50	50	43
Do not know	14	10	19	17	12	15
Total percent	100	100	100	100	100	100

One of the most interesting features of the above tables is the big difference in the distribution of answers by sex of the interviewees on the first question. A

clear majority of the men believe we shall have a new non-socialist government after the election, while a bare majority of the women asked believe we shall still have a government coming from the Labor Party. It is natural to believe that this is connected, to some degree at least, with the change of prime ministers in February.

The answers to the second question were also broken down by the interviewees' political sympathies, i.e. by which party they would vote for.

Question 2. Prefer:	All Interviewed %	Political Sympathy [see below]:					
		A	SV	H	Kr.F.	S	V
		%	%	%	%	%	%
Continued labor gov't	38	82	79	2	6	13	13
Change of government	48	7	11	92	83	74	68
Do not know	14	11	10	6	11	13	19
Total percent	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

A = Labor Party

SV = Socialist-Left Party

H = Conservative Party

Kr.F. = Christian People's Party

S = Center Party

V = Liberal Party

It can also be seen that most Norwegians are optimists with regard to the outcome of the election. A cross sort between the answers to the two questions shows that of those who still prefer a Labor Party government there are 64 percent that believe that this will be the result of the Storting election, while 20 percent of them believe that we shall get a non-socialist government after the election. Among those who hope for a non-socialist government there are correspondingly only 13 percent that believe we shall still have a Labor government and 72 percent that believe there will be a government coming from non-socialist parties.

Question A1: "Do you believe this year's election campaign will have greater significance for the election result than previous election campaigns, or do you believe it will have about the same significance as before, or do you believe it will have less significance?"

	All Interviewed	Men	Women	Under 30	30-59	60 & Over
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Greater significance	37	39	34	38	38	32
Same significance	48	50	45	44	50	47
Less significance	3	3	3	2	2	4
Do not know	12	8	18	16	10	17
Total percent	100	100	100	100	100	100

481)

CSO: 5118/142



## PAPER COMMENTS ON RIGHTWARD TREND IN POLLS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 May 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Norwegian voters are on the move. Greatly increased voter movement and a clear swing toward the right are two important tendencies that have influenced political developments in the seventies. In his book: "Election and Politics--a Society in Change," the result of much research, Professor Henry Valen provides extensive documentation of the so-called "conservative tide," among other things. Although Valen is careful in drawing conclusions about the shifts that have taken place, his description, the analysis itself, is such that the interested and insightful political observer will nod in recognition and approval. Perhaps faster than anyone had believed possible, profound economic and social structural changes have created a different society from that which influenced prewar generation voters.

Obviously, none of us are unaffected by the great economic and social changes that have influenced the development of our society, but they apply particularly to the postwar generation, more specifically voters who were born after 1940. These voters have had completely different experiences from previous generations. A large number of them who vote in present-day parliamentary and local elections have a completely different view of society and politics than does the older generation. Professor Valen believes he can prove that most of the political changes, including the conservative tide, can be ascribed to the postwar generation. The conservative tide is strongest among young people, both with respect to the gain of the Conservative Party and the decline of the Labor Party.

Professor Valen makes the reflection that since the long-term processes of economic and social change began shortly after the war, while the Conservative Party did not gain considerably until the seventies, there can be no direct connection between the two phenomena. We believe the professor to some degree underestimates the effects of the process to which he himself attaches great importance in explaining the changes we are now registering in a multitude of voters. This is, indeed, a matter of distinct long-term effects which gradually--and step by step--have contributed to a changed society, which, in turn, have also affected the individual's social status, his attitudes, interests and needs. It is interesting to note that the old class distinctions and the identification with the laboring class have been greatly weakened. More than anything else, this is a result of the economic and

social development that began during the early postwar years. Obviously, however, other political factors have also contributed to the long-term process that has helped to wipe out the traditional contrasts.

It is strange that the Labor Party has been unable to adjust its policies to the changing social condition, that the party has failed to understand that the wealth and welfare society it helped to establish gradually created new expectations and needs among the people of our time. The message of more and more socialism must seem like sheer anachronism, considering the reality in which most people find themselves.

The strong fluctuations among a multitude of voters do not necessarily reflect a conservative tide, although the swing to the right is clear enough. We are quite simply in an epoch.

8952

CSO: 3108/143

## BRUNDTLAND, WILLOCH DEBATE SOCIAL POLICIES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 May 81 p 3

[Article by Kjell Harberg and Terje Svabo]

[Excerpts] Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland did not want to say prior to the election whether the Labor Party's goal is for owners to be in minority on corporate executive boards. In a debate with Kare Willoch in Eidsvoll yesterday, she was asked several times, both by the Conservative Party leader and by the audience, but refused to answer on the grounds that Willoch must first answer how much tax relief the Conservative Party will give the Norwegian people. "The prime minister has used many words before to explain something without giving an answer," Willoch pointed out. "Now she refuses to answer." It is evident that neither the party chairman nor the prime minister will answer the voters before the election.

Even the discussion that followed the opening statements centered around economic policies, specifically which reforms the Norwegian society can afford in the years ahead. Willoch stated that Gro Harlem Brundtland refuses to answer whether owners will be in the minority on corporate executive boards.

The debate also touched on security policy, but only briefly, because the prime minister declared she was now tired of repeating for Willoch her position on this issue instead of concentrating on other themes. Willoch said the prime minister was obviously not interested in discussing security policy with the Conservatives, but would reserve that discussion for internal Labor Party use.

Later, however, during the question period, this issue was brought up again when the question was asked how we might reduce the nuclear threat in our part of the world. Kare Willoch underscored that this can only be achieved through mutual reduction of nuclear arms, in the East as well as in the West, and not by a unilateral reduction in the West. "It is crucial that we limit Soviet nuclear weapons. That alone will provide security. Moving Soviet weapons gives us nothing--they will reach us regardless. And," stressed Willoch, "no one should believe we will gain security through a Soviet guarantee not to use nuclear weapons against us."

"The Soviet Union guaranteed it would not use weapons against Afghanistan; that happened shortly before the invasion."

Willoch asked the prime minister to confirm that a unilateral Norwegian decision on nuclear free zones is not the way to go. Gro Harlem Brundtland responded that the Labor Party's program serves as the platform for the line the government intends to follow. "We shall work for nuclear free zones as part of a larger European interdependence and there must be mutual reduction of nuclear weapons," the prime minister pointed out.

Like the issue of socializing Norwegian industries, the prime minister did not want to answer whether or not she supports continued use of grades in our schools.

"That is an issue one cannot answer with a "yes" or "no." We have already removed the grade system on the elementary level. Studies are now under way as to what would be the most suitable future pedagogical solutions. "Yes" or "no" to grades is a simplification of the problem which I will not allow myself to be forced into," said the prime minister.

Kare Willoch opposed Gro Harlem Brundtland on this point and said it must be possible to give a clear answer to this question. The party's parliamentary leader made it clear that the Conservative Party for its part wants the schools to use an evaluation system.

8952

CSO: 3108/143

## POLL SHOWS WILLOCH FAVORED OVER BRUNDTLAND

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 21 May 81 p 6

[Text] Kåre Willoch has taken back the 5 percent lead that Gro Harlem Brundtland had in February in the voters' view of whom they want as prime minister after the fall election. Both got 47 percent in the opinion poll that the Norwegian Public Opinion Institute took in April for ARBEIDERBLADET.

In April only 6 percent answered "don't know." Willoch has increased his support from 40 to 47 percent, while Harlem Brundtland has increased from 45 to 47 percent. In February the choice "neither of the two" was included, and 6 percent preferred that choice, but 9 percent answered "don't know." This means that the "don't know" group has decreased from 15 to 6 percent, as it is assumed that these two choices are viewed as fairly equivalent.

The April poll shows that more voters have accepted the two as the real candidates for prime minister, and that it is Willoch that has gained most by that. It is still among the women that Harlem Brundtland has the greatest following; 54 percent want her, 42 percent Willoch. It is the other way around with the men. Here the figures are 41 percent for Gro and 45 percent for Kåre.

It is Oslo and Akershus voters that more than any others rally around the conservative candidate. Here there are twice as many--63 against 31 percent--that prefer him to the incumbent prime minister. In the rest of East Norway the situation is almost reversed--56 against 39 percent.

With regard to the various age groups there is no special difference, and among the young the two are tied: 47-47.

As might be expected, the two candidates get almost full support among their own parties' voters. Eighty-nine percent of the Labor voters want Gro; 93 percent of the Conservative voters want to have their own parliamentary leader. In the parties of the center it is primarily the Liberal Party's voters that show a view of the prime minister candidates differing from what one might think natural from the political bloc the party belongs to. Fifty percent of the Liberal voters want the Labor Party's prime minister, 44 percent the Conservative Party's prime minister.

9915

CSO: 3108/142



## POLL SHOWS 57 PERCENT HAVE CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 22 May 81 p 7

[Report by Thor Viksveen]

[Text] Fifty-seven percent of the voters have great confidence in the Harlem Brundtland government. Forty-four percent have little confidence in the government. This is shown by an opinion poll that the Norwegian Public Opinion Institute took for ARBEIDERBLADET in April. The answers are distributed with 12 percent who answer "very great" and 45 percent who answer "fairly great" confidence in the government; 34 percent answered that they had "fairly little" and 10 percent "very little" confidence.

A corresponding opinion poll that NOI [Norwegian Public Opinion Institute] carried out for ARBEIDERBLADET in February showed that 61 percent answered that they had great confidence in Harlem Brundtland and her ministers. At that time 37 percent answered that they had fairly little confidence. There has thus been a certain turn away from the very positive acceptance the government got at first.

Of the Labor Party voters, 93 percent answer in the April poll that they have great confidence in the government. This is followed by the SV [Socialist Left Party] with 89 percent. Among the SP [Center Party] voters opinions are divided in the middle (49-49). The Conservative Party's voters are naturally enough the most skeptical--26 percent answer that they have great confidence, 73 percent little confidence.

The government gets far more support among women than among men. Sixty-one percent of the women have great confidence in the government team. The support among men is 52 percent.

The poll shows that the government has a weaker position in Oslo and Akershus than in the rest of the country. In those two counties it is 38 percent that give the government a positive report, while the figures for the rest of East Norway are 38 percent *[sic]*.

Interview with Bjørn Tore Godal

Support for the government is thus weaker in the Oslo and Akershus area than in the rest of the country. In a poll on which one would prefer as prime minister...

Willoch or Harlem Brundtland--that was published in ARBEIDERBLADET yesterday, 31 percent answered that they prefer the incumbent prime minister. The figure on a national basis was 47 percent for her.

[Question] Secretary of the Oslo Labor Party Bjørn Tore Godal, is this not a disturbingly low figure, when compared with the government's and the prime minister's strong support on a national basis?

[Answer] On the question of whom the voters want as prime minister, the Oslo Labor Party and ARBEIDERBLADET carried out a corresponding poll in collaboration in March. At that time we asked exclusively Oslo voters. That poll showed that 42 percent preferred the incumbent prime minister, while 44 percent wanted to have Willoch. The interview base in that poll was larger than in the one published in ARBEIDERBLADET yesterday, and we must therefore assume that the conclusion is more reliable. I therefore feel sure that Harlem Brundtland has a very strong position in the capital. In the Oslo Labor Party we have no impression of any negative mood, either. Quite the contrary.

I am not in a position to see the reason that such a dramatic drop should be found in the attitude on whom the Oslo voters prefer as prime minister as this last poll suggests. I must add that any poll in which Willoch has a lead over Harlem Brundtland is still unsatisfactory.

[Question] But today's poll on confidence in the government reinforces the impression of a weak position for the Labor Party in the capital, does it not?

[Answer] There have been misgivings that the Conservative Party may have a stronger position in the Oslo area than in other geographic areas of the country. We also have a much stronger party dichotomy in this city than elsewhere. Around over the country the parties of the center are far stronger, and it is interesting to note that the attitude toward the government is far more positive among these bourgeois voters.

Thirty-eight percent of the voters in the Oslo and Akershus area answer that they have great confidence in the government. The municipal election of 1979 gave 33.5 percent to the Labor Party in Oslo. If this attitude is also an expression of choice of party, I think the figures are very positive with regard to the Oslo Labor Party.

8815

CSO: 5108/142

## COUNTRY'S LEADING POLITICAL ANALYST LOOKS AT UPCOMING VOTE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 May 81 p 41

[Book review by Arild Isegg]

[Text] Big shifts in the electorate and a definite turn toward the right characterized the political development in the 1970's, in Norway as well as in a number of other countries. Prof Henry Valen, our foremost election analyst, has undertaken to describe the scope and character of the shifts and also to explain why they took place. Three years' work has resulted in the book "Valg og Politikk" [Elections and Politics], which the publishing firm NKS is bringing out today. The author has succeeded better with the descriptive part of the task than with the explanatory part. There is a connection here: the more data the more complicated the picture becomes. And in this book the amount of data is overwhelming. The election analyst reacts with the scientist's customary caution: He draws adequately sure and clear conclusions.

Even though the main emphasis in the book is placed on the situation at the end of the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's, it embraces practically speaking the entire postwar period and gives an exceptional survey of the lines of development in modern Norwegian politics. Norwegian election research in the past has given insights into political phenomena at a given time and devoted itself very little to the development in time. Valen has analyzed the long-term trends. He has based his study on data from an election research program that was started in 1957 at the Institute for Social Research, a program that a number of other researchers have taken part in. The basic material for the work of analysis comes principally from interview surveys in connection with all of the Storting elections from 1957 to 1977 except the election of 1961; in other words, five elections. In addition there are the election statistics and various opinion polls. The study covers three periods into which it is natural to divide the postwar period: The stable period up to 1960, the 1960's, which were characterized by the fact that the Labor Party lacked a majority in the Storting and a joint non-socialist government alternative was established, and the troubled 1970's, which contrast in many ways with the preceding decade.

The book is arranged in four parts. The first three give an account of political alternatives and the party development, and also analyses of the political

development in relation to the social structure and ideological lines of demarcation. With this as background the individual shifts among the voters are analyzed in the last part. Altogether it amounts to a good 400 pages, packed tight with details, tables, and figures that it will be a delight to plunge into for all who care about politics, especially in the parties.

Most of what is presented is new material in the sense that it has not been published before. Nevertheless, to many people part of the material will seem familiar. This is due to the fact that in certain fields the book documents things that have been more or less suspected in advance. Election analysis has in common with other social science research that it sometimes verifies the obvious. The book's great value, however, is that it conveys knowledge and overwhelmingly well founded conclusions where the self-appointed political experts and the political observers have hitherto had to content themselves with more or less qualified observations and conjectures.

A discussion of such a weighty work will have difficulty doing the author full justice within a limited format. It can only attempt to deal with individual things that stand out, first and foremost certain specific findings, and then what insight Valen has to give us into the conservative wave. These things speak for themselves. Here we shall only mention some few of the many arguments and conclusions that call for counter-suggestions.

In some concluding observations concerning the further development, Prof Valen speculates about the generation conflicts that are observed among the voters. He finds it not inconceivable that corresponding conflicts may make themselves felt at the leadership level, and points out that if this is the case we can expect that much of the unrest will die down when a new generation has established itself in positions. Yes, we are tempted to add, provided that the new generation that takes over is homogeneous. The party that is in a generation shift right now, the Labor Party, does not find itself with fewer conflicts in the leadership stratum.

Valen answers with a definite "no" to the question of whether we are moving in the direction of a two-party system, and points out that the combined vote of the Labor Party and the Conservative Party has remained stable at about two thirds of the votes cast. The question, however, is whether we can rule out a further shrinkage of the parties of the center at the same time that the Labor Party and the Conservative Party stabilize as parties of equal size. That, if it happened, would carry us far in the direction of a two-party system, in the sense that the voters would more and more regard the two parties as the only useful government alternatives. Such a process will presumably grow stronger the more difficult it becomes for the smaller parties on the non-socialist side to enter into a coalition with the Conservative Party. The idea suggests itself that bourgeois voters will rally around the Conservative Party more strongly if it is clear to them that only that party represents the alternative to a socialist government. But the advantage of a pure two-party system--strong, stable governments with a majority behind them--we shall not get until the small-party growth is cleared away. At best that is far away.

There may also be room for a reminder that even election research has its limitations, including one that follows from the fact that the researchers operate with models when they want to test their hypotheses. Human behavior--including voter

subsequent six too smallfold to fit entirely in simple models. It therefore comes in handy when the vision researcher, in addition to unimpeachable professional standards, shows a certain degree of political understanding, as Valen does in his book.

The book also gives the impression that the material he has had to work with gives room for different and complex interpretations. That has led to its being somewhat hard to grasp what Valen really thinks he can prove about the voters' shifts and the reasons for them.

This big, relatively hard-to-digest work is hardly popular reading. To reach a broader public the publisher is simultaneously issuing a shortened and simplified edition, edited by the NRK [Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation] reporters Asbjørn Larsen and Arne Strand, under the title "valgere på vandring" (Voters on the move). Besides giving the presentation a journalistic form, they have left out nearly all of the figures, tables, and statistical material. In return, the book is decorated with drawings by Rigmor Grønne.

In the long or in the popular version, Valen's work is required reading for everyone who is concerned with politics in the widest sense, i.e. the development of our society, as far that matter of any western democratic welfare society.

#### CONSERVATIVE WAVE NOT EASY TO EXPLAIN

The so-called "conservative wave" is first and foremost an expression for the Conservative Party's enormous gain from the last half of the 1970's. It can be roughly described by the election results: from a voter support of about 20 per cent in the 1960's the Conservative Party rose by the end of the 1970's to nearly 30 per cent. Opinion polls show that time gives no indication that the wave is spending. As to the question of why the conservative wave came about, Prof. Oddvar Ytterhus gives an unambiguous answer on the basis of his extensive material.

In view of the interest that attaches to the conservative wave, it is regrettable that the author seems to have had a poor luck when with this particular phenomenon. The presentation seems somewhat uncertain and not always equally convincing. The explanation for the conservative wave must be sought in part in social structural relationships, Valen points out. The process of urbanization and the economic development have led to larger parts of the population's tending to urban home-like cities (the Conservative Party and the Labor Party stand as the chief opponents).

While rejecting the possibility of economic and social factors as an explanation for the conservative wave in the electorate in general, but this not as an excuse. Thus the somewhat striking of the shift, that is the conservative direction, in the 1970's, he accepts that these processes have created good conditions for the conservative wave and that for many years they have run in the Conservative Party's favor.

The author mentions that class conflicts and identification with the working class is important, especially in the Labor Party's electoral shift from a decline.



tendency. He suggests many causes for this: Rising standards of living have affected habits of consumption, affected status relationships, and led to larger parts of the population's acquiring property interests. He also mentions that the Conservative Party's support increases with increasing income. He also attributes great importance to the education explosion in this connection as well as with regard to the political development in general.

But, Valen points out, the long-term processes of economic and social change got underway immediately after the war, while the Conservative Party's great gains came in the 1970's. Consequently there is no direct connection between the two phenomena, he concludes, and goes on: "It was probably political events that were the deciding factor, primarily the EC issue." In other words, the breakdown of established party loyalties, a theme that Valen treats in greater detail elsewhere.

In this connection he calls attention to the paradox that in spite of the Conservative Party's being on the losing side on the EC issue, it is the party that won most in the processes that the issue set in motion. The paradox consists primarily in the fact that the many traditional Labor Party supporters among the EC opponents who broke with their old party were most inclined to shift over to the Conservative Party.

The Conservative Party's gains took place at the cost of both the Labor Party and the parties of the center, but the shifts have changed in character: A new feature is the direct shift from the socialist parties to the Conservative Party. Valen says that this is due in part to the old Liberal Party's having dropped out as a buffer between the Labor Party and the Conservative Party. "Furthermore," he writes, "there is the question of whether the distance between these two parties is not regarded as less today than a few decades ago." There can hardly be any doubt about that.

Valen finds the relationship between the Conservative Party and the parties of the center equally noteworthy: The formation of non-socialist coalition governments in the 1960's blurred in the voters' consciousness many of the traditional differences between these parties and gave the Conservative Party new legitimacy among the center parties' voters.

It seems most noteworthy to Valen that the Conservative Party won a foothold in the last half of the 1970's in the countercultures--New Norwegian, temperance, and religious laymen's movements--and has become an acceptable alternative in the countercultures' strongholds on the south and west coasts.

Reducing the conservative wave to a pure protest against the governing party, according to Valen, would be an oversimplification: If that had been the case, several of the opposition parties would have made gains, not just the Conservative Party.

The trend to the right is clearly determined by specific issues, underlying ideological currents, and evaluations of leadership, he says in one place. The leadership factor involves the consideration that the Conservative Party is the only party that has been without leadership problems or internal conflicts worth mentioning, phenomena that are rightly assumed to weaken the voters' confidence in a party. As far as ideology is concerned, Valen maintains that it is not easy

to find explanations for the turn to the right on that basis. The conservative wave must be interpreted as a desire for new priorities, rather than a demand for a fundamental change in the system, he insists.

#### Youth Leads the Way

Analyses of any the voters have switched in recent decades have rewarded Prof Henry Valen with a number of findings. Only two of the most interesting will be mentioned here, both focusing on young voters: Significant generation differences and decreasing class conflicts.

The shifts from election to election are far greater among young voters than among the middle-aged and elderly. That tendency in itself has long been known and is not surprising. It is confirmed by findings in a number of other countries. If it is worthy of special mention, that is because we have to do here with a new orientation within the new generation—more precisely defined as the voters born after 1945. These are voters with a background of experience that is completely different from that of earlier generations.

Most of the political changes, including the conservative wave, can be attributed to the postwar generation, Valen states. The conservative wave is most powerful among the young, both in gains for the Conservative Party and in losses for the Labor Party. In the under 30 age group, the Labor Party's share of the votes decreased by half from 1957 to 1979 (from 64 to 32 percent), while the Conservative Party doubled its share (from 15 to 31 percent). Especially the combination of youth and high education entails a divergent pattern both in voting behavior and in the formation of opinion.

The fact that the correlation between voting and the voters' social background has grown noticeably less in recent years is due almost entirely to the generation born after 1945. Similarly, it is especially the young voters that are to be thanked for the decline in class conflicts. Not only is there considerable change in the wave, i.e. fewer think of themselves as belonging to a particular class, but the percentage that identify themselves with the working class is diminishing beyond of the middle-class.

Valen's material shows that the political parties' losses among the voters are due to their failure among young voters. In the 1950's and 1960's the working class constituted nearly two thirds of these interviewees. In 1979 its proportion had dropped to just over half. This does not mean that people grow more class-conscious with increasing age, but the eldest age groups acquired their class consciousness in a more class-oriented society, while the postwar generation grew up in a society with priorities where class distinctions.

In this connection, too, the combination of youth and high education results in the greatest deviation, and this indicates genuine prospects for the socialist party. The more they succeed in eliminating class differences, the more they undermine their foundation.

## NEW BOOK DETAILS HISTORY OF DISPUTE WITH USSR OVER SVALBARD

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 May 81 p 5

(Article by Nils Morten Udgaard)

[Text] "How could a Norwegian foreign minister have agreed to this and how will I get us out of it?" These were Halvard Lange's somewhat despairing words to the British ambassador to Oslo in January 1947 after the Norwegian-Soviet issue concerning Svalbard had surfaced again--and foreign minister Lange had learned what his predecessor, Trygve Lie, did in the winter of 1945.

In an address to the Academy of Science entitled "The Svalbard Crisis 1944-1945," historian Olav Riste revealed new material on that diplomatic struggle in the North gained from British archives that were recently opened to researchers. Riste's starting point was the demand from foreign minister Molotov that Norway would have to relinquish Bjornoya and establish a joint Norwegian-Soviet government on Svalbard--the demand was put to Lie at a meeting in the Kremlin between 11 and 12 the night of 11 November 1944. Shortly before that, allied Soviet troops had marched into Norway and liberated parts of East Finnmark.

The Norwegian government in London essentially obliged the Russians in its first answer and agreed to bilateral discussions of the matter--but, at the same time, kept a number of options open. "A diplomatic masterpiece," was Riste's characterization. However, Molotov went further; his reaction to Norway's answer was "a willful suppression of facts," in the opinion of prime minister Johan Nygaardsvold. In a written reaction, Molotov said the Norwegian government had now proposed to negotiate joint military defense of Svalbard and would later consult with its Western allies--the Kremlin said it ostensibly agreed with that idea, but that it also demanded negotiations concerning coal operations and an annulment of the Svalbard Treaty.

After that, the Norwegian government "took the first long step on a downward path that was supposed to end in a diplomatic defeat," said Riste. Government advisors were divided--some wanted to say "yes" in principle only and others wanted Norway to submit a complete treaty proposal for joint military defense of Svalbard. The government followed the latter suggestion, but only after a big showdown between Lie and Nygaardsvold, who wanted to show greater reserve. The Norwegian ambassador

in Moscow, Solve Andvord, submitted such a proposal to Molotov 11 March. He hoped but it does not seem to have been a definite Norwegian demand--that the negotiations themselves would wait until the war was over. Surprisingly enough, Molotov agreed to that, but wanted to put down on paper, in the form of a statement, what the two countries had agreed on. Strangely enough, the Norwegians treated this as an urgent matter in April 1945 and moved another step toward the Russians by drafting a joint statement. It clearly stated that the neutralization of Svalbard, which is outlined in paragraph nine of the Svalbard Treaty, had proven to be impractical and obviously in conflict with the two countries' interests.

"The lie had been cast because it is rather clear that such a joint statement would have established an irrevocable tie as far as Norway was concerned," said Riste. But then the unexpected happened when the Russians let the matter rest; no joint statement was signed and Molotov did not bring up the matter again until 1946--in an entirely different international situation. Molotov seems to have played for even higher stakes: He had not given up the special demand concerning Bjornoya and he did not want the joint Norwegian-Soviet military establishments on Svalbard to be located on land owned by the Norwegian state. His play for higher stakes ended in loss because the Norwegian government refused to revise the Svalbard Treaty in February 1947.

In his address, Riste highlighted many special aspects with regard to Norway's handling of the crisis 1944-1945. Firstly, Lie wanted to treat the matter as a purely Norwegian-Soviet concern, without effectively trying to get the backing of her Western allies--although there is much evidence that Molotov would have agreed to a broader discussion. Furthermore, ambassador Andvord acted on his own: He communicated the matter to his British colleague, contrary to Lie's wishes. Andvord also told Britain that he, personally, would advise Norway to be accommodating with respect to Svalbard, which might eventually lead to compensation in terms of a border adjustment or Pechenga: "Bjornoya was of no value to Norway and might rather be used as a Soviet air base," said the ambassador.

Secondly, Norway was the aggressor throughout the period; it felt compelled to come up with a proposal and to take the initiative--this is an "inexplicable aspect" with regard to Norway's handling of the matter," said Riste. He pointed out that the friendly reception given Lie and his delegation in Moscow November 1944 and proposed the Norwegian side, therefore, the Svalbard demand came as a regular shock. "It might have been a trial balloon to see how the Norwegian government would react under pressure and, it was just that--as we have seen--a successful trial balloon," said Riste.

There were some parallels between Svalbard and Soviet demands for more rights in the Balkans and pressure on Turkey during and just after the war. The Svalbard demand was not considered equally important--although access to open waters was also an issue here. Only 3 years prior to the Svalbard demand--in July 1941--Germany attacked the Soviet Union--Norway received assurances from Britain through British foreign minister Anthony Eden that the British government did not have any territorial demands with respect to Norway and that "it could give any promise."

"The Russian move, 'come to grips' diplomatically in 1944-1945 was just one of a series of new and completely unknown demands to us. It was pure politics and Norway had no precedent and no pattern to follow," also Riste pointed out in his address.

END

PHS: 1108/101

## PSOE LEADER INTERVIEWED ON TERRORISM, ELECTION PROSPECTS

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 30 May 81 pp 27-R - 30-R

[Interview with Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) leader Felipe Gonzalez, by Maria Joao Avillez; in Portugal, date not given]

[Text] Rui Ochoa and I left Lisbon that Sunday morning with our hearts in our mouths. Barcelona remained to be resolved, and the situation in Spain was extremely disturbing. Felipe Gonzalez was not scheduled to be in Badajoz, where his presence had been announced for the closing of the Second Regional Congress of the Socialist Party of Extremadura.

We entered the hotel precipitously, and then were told: "Felipe has already arrived."

We went to meet him in the rear of the main room, buried in a sofa, wearing a gray pullover, with a serious expression, and with headphones, listening tensely to the news from National Radio of Spain. A few minutes later, the interview (which I had requested of him a few days earlier by telephone) was arranged for after lunch.

At 1700 hours, a procession went to the second floor of the hotel: the photographer, Rui Ochoa, two bodyguards who did not leave the secretary general for even a second, a "comrade" from the PSOE, Felipe Gonzalez and the reporter.

It was a calm conversation with a worried man, but one who, primarily, has not ceased, come what may, his struggle for peace and democracy on Spanish territory. For this purpose, he has even had to give up, temporarily, certain principles in his party's program.

Despite the tension and the unknown future that is in store for Spain today, Felipe Gonzalez left a message of optimism in that small hotel room.

And he left as he had entered: with a lighted cigar, and that manner indicating that only he must be concerned, without, meanwhile, failing to know where he is going, how he is going and why he is going....

EXPRESSO: With whom shall I be speaking? With a man experiencing a certain amount of bitterness, some fear and a certain degree of uneasiness?

Felipe Gonzalez: No.



EXPRESSO: But is he not one who is currently in somewhat difficult straits, not knowing what could happen in his country tomorrow?

P.G.: No. In any event, I am a person concerned with all the events happening in Spain, someone who reflects on the priority of values which govern or determine his political behavior. And, as part of that priority, you may find it surprising if I tell you that the most important thing to me at present is making a policy that will prevent another civil confrontation among the Spanish people,

EXPRESSO: From a partisan standpoint?

P.G.: Yes, yes, as head of the PSOE. And when I say this I am considering the fact that democracy must survive and endure; it must be defended from the attacks that it has sustained, so as to preclude the possibility of Spain's embarking on a cruel, bloody confrontation again.

EXPRESSO: But what means do you have at your disposal to prevent it, inasmuch as it is an unequal confrontation? On the one side, your side and that of the other parties, the democratic game is being played, and the rules are obeyed. But on the other, the side of the terrorists, as we are now witnessing in Barcelona, that does not hold true,...

P.G.: Yes, but I am convinced of something that is very serious. I do not have many weapons, many tools, although I believe that I have sufficient popular support and sufficient merit among the people for them to understand what I am saying. And the first thing that we must be certain and convinced of is that terrorism, by itself, does not terminate democracy. It will be relatively difficult to combat, in addition to the fact that the battle against terrorism requires a battle strategy that could vary, because, of course, it must be geared to the measures that are taken against it. When a certain measure is adopted, the terrorists change their tactics to evade that measure, and then one must constantly use intelligence to find the best means of putting an end to them. But terrorism, by itself, with its action, will never put an end to the democratic state.

EXPRESSO: Perhaps not terrorism, but what could put an end to democracy are the results of terrorism...

P.G.: It is that precisely. It is the coup d'etat which could be based on terrorist activity, and therein seek its excuse and its raison d'être.

EXPRESSO: Do you think that this will eventually happen?

P.G.: This was attempted. There was an attempt on 13 February, which was thwarted, but I think that we should not exclude the possibility that there may be a group which will make another attempt. Therefore, in my opinion, the government's policy should cover with the major problems of Spain which are, like those of other countries, compounded by some different ones. Interest in Spain: an economic crisis, the development, construction of the autonomous and democratization of the state, and a strong, secure international policy that will cause Spain to occupy the position that it deserves among the nations. And then, specifically in Spain, the battle against terrorism and against the activation of the attempts at a coup. It is in connection with this task that I think it would be difficult for a minority government, with certain contradictions in its backing, to emerge victorious. It is this which gives me a certain amount of pessimism...

## Government Gives More Thought to Dictatorship Than to Democracy

EXPRESSO: What does the leader of the PSOE propose, in this situation?

F.G.: What I have already proposed: that we be capable of giving up, temporarily, certain differences in program to preserve what is essential. The main thing is still coexisting with liberty and peace within Spain. And, for this purpose, it is necessary to give up part of our specific aspirations in the program, without, however, giving up our identity. There must be a strong government, with a large parliamentary base and great social support. This is what I think is missing today. devote our effort at negotiation with the government, not acting in an antagonistic manner, and allowing it to survive.

EXPRESSO: In your view, why didn't the government accept your coalition?

F.G.: That would be a wonderful question for you to ask the president of the government! What is my interpretation? I think that the government did not accept these proposals basically for reasons of a political nature. That is, perhaps the government is giving more thought to elections than to democracy. I give more thought to democracy than to elections. And there may be a major difference therein in this context. I recall a comment made by Terribus which illustrates very well what I am trying to explain: The difference between a politician and a statesman is that the politician is always thinking about the next election, and the statesman is thinking about the next generations...

## Terrorism: A Threat to the Spanish Population

EXPRESSO: Returning to terrorism. Do you think that we might be witnessing an new, peculiar alliance between the far right and the far left?

F.G.: That exists, without doubt. It exists, subjectively, that is, sometimes. There are individuals infiltrated into the two types of terrorist action. And it also exists objectively, sometimes (and I am absolutely sure of this) there is a group of individuals from the far right who make use of, if not allow, another type of terrorism, because this benefits their own interests in political destabilization and the organization of a coup. Therein lies a genuine sinister plot, as it may be termed, involving the terrorist phenomenon which is still a phenomenon that, in my opinion, does not involve more than 1 percent of the Spanish population. And the same movement does not represent over 1 or 1.5 percent of the Spanish population either. What I mean is that 99 percent of the Spanish people want to live in democracy and peace, whether these Spaniards are on the right or the left. So that 1 percent is capable of endangering the democratic state with its terrorist actions.

EXPRESSO: Then how can we interpret the fact that there is now a kind of popular front, who is Hitler, Assad and Castro, as I gathered when I was in Madrid recently?

F.G.: No, that is not true. Only that 1 percent is involved, and this will be proven in the next elections, because the people who are close to Telero do not operate in this way. And we shall see how much more they win in the next elections. They do want that our whole population is, and how many people voted for the alternative that Telero represents.

ESPRESSO: I can clearly perceive what you mean; but that 95 percent of the people who, you claim, want democracy is one thing, and a country and a people who are witnessing death every day, or nearly every day, whether it be that of generals, or civil guards, it doesn't matter, is something else. There are already some who say that they refuse to pay the price of democracy at the cost of their life. How should I interpret this?

F.O.I: This can be readily understood. There is a problem, namely that of security and liberty. The feeling of security is, in my opinion, more preeminent than that of liberty. For a person to be able to feel free (I am referring to the vast majority of the population), he must feel secure. That is the great tragedy, and the terrorists, both of the far right and the far left, know how to use this to perfection. But what must be stated quite clearly is that a dictatorship would not solve these problems, and that there were 40 years of dictatorship in Spain and, during them, tens of thousands of people died, although the press and television could not say this at the time. The great deception is convincing people that a dictatorship can insure the citizens' peace of mind in Spain. What a dictatorship does is to crush out a major part of the population, with torture, imprisonment and death. This happened in Spain, and no one should forget it. Hence, there is no system better than liberty, despite the security risks that are run.

These risks are infinitely better known than the ones run with a dictatorship. For example, let us consider a Latin American dictatorship. It may be claimed that the people are calm, but it is not true! In those countries, under these dictatorships, entire families disappear, people are tortured and die. It is a problem of terrorism by the state, of unbelievable dimensions....

LEONARDO: Right, it is another type of terrorism!

F.O.I: Of course, it is merely that the newspapers are silent, because they cannot speak. The image that it is attempted to give of the dictatorship is a false image, which makes use of propaganda, but which uses it paradoxically; and this is one of the great contradictions in freedom of the press. There is a splendid comment by Ferns Calves in the last century, about the way in which the absolutists refer to freedom of the press: "With what gravity and with what hardness freedom of the press punishes those who defend it, and paves the way for those who expect it to be able to come to power and eliminate it!"

DISSENT OR COLLECTIVE PSYCHOSIS

ESPRESSO: In Spain it is said (or they attempt to give the impression) that the coup occurred after the coup of 23 February. Do you make that claim too? For example, don't you think that there is a far more stringent control on the part of the Armed Forces? Don't you think that there is now a more "masculine" or limited democracy being established?

F.O.I: Yes, I think that there is an individual and collective psychosis that, in a country, sometimes may have ended, ending in the attempted coup; and this psychosis completely has determined the attitude of the people, the political leaders and the government itself. The army actually did have a psychological attack, and the people that it dominated psychologically, so that they may fully express the psychosis.

vicer. On the other hand, I also think that people do not think very much. In Spain the dictatorship was experienced for 40 years. In Portugal, it was even longer, but no one would deny that your country did not undergo the dreadful experience of the civil war and the post-war period. That cannot be readily forgotten. Thus, whether we like it or not, 23 February also served to recall all this horror. Now that has conditioned the people psychologically; and it is understandable that this occur. It is this phenomenon that we are witnessing. If anyone claims that the Army is in command of the political forces, that person is in fact lying.

EXPRESSO: Then substitute the verb "determine" for command, for example...or "influencing" the king, the parties and the government....

P.G.: I think not. I believe that this is more of a psychological problem than a real one.

What? (Chatter and Silence)

EXPRESSO: would you care to recall for me how you spent the night of 23 February in Parliament? Or rather, would you recall what you felt at the time, what feelings came over you, what you thought?

P.G.: I experienced in particular a feeling of humiliation and shame. To think that there are individuals paid by all Spaniards, in whose hands we put weapons to defend the institutions, legality and democracy, and that those individuals use these weapons against those whom they should be defending, in principle, and do not use their ability to put an end to those who are jeopardizing this democracy. This is the great contradiction, and the feeling of frustration that one feels at a time like that. I think that this was the predominant feeling, along with others which are perhaps more difficult to explain. I recalled many years of struggle against the dictatorship, and how difficult it would be (if democracy were terminated) to set up another democratic system, and the price that the Spanish people would have to pay; and so many, many, other things....

EXPRESSO: Three months later, with the information to which a political leader of your importance has access, do you think that Lejero acted alone, with half a dozen henchmen, or that there were highly placed people involved in all this?

P.G.: No....

EXPRESSO: But I am referring to things that may have happened which we do not yet know about. In other words, apart from what is known officially, what do you know?

P.G.: What concerns me most about the night of 23 February is finding out who were the civilians behind it, and not the military....

EXPRESSO: And...do you know now?

P.G.: No, I have only a few clues. And what concerns me most is precisely the fact that those people have not been punished by law, owing to the difficulty in proving the degree of their involvement. The fact is, in my opinion, that there is a group of civilians which has poisoned the Army, and even the forces of public order themselves.

## Increasing Disappointments and Feeding Hatred

ESPRESSO: How, by what means?

F.G.: In many ways, including economically. But there are, in particular, ideological processes, for increasing disappointments and feeding hatred; even making these individuals believe that, by dissociating themselves from their obligations and the institutions, and attempting a coup, they would become the saviors of the nation. In reality, the nation consists of 36 million Spaniards, and if they think that they are right and that all the rest of us are not, then let them explain this to the people, so that they may vote for them, because they are the saviors of the nation. But let them not use arms!

ESPRESSO: Do you think that, in next year's elections, if Spain continues to be the scene of acts of terrorism, with death and mourning, you and your party might be harmed?

F.G.: The first thing that I should say is that I am not so much concerned about who will win the elections, but I am concerned about whether there will be elections.

ESPRESSO: That is very interesting! Therefore, you raise the question of elections not taking place? In other words, there is a question about that possibility....

F.G.: What I mean is that I am really concerned about elections taking place. At the present time, I am, therefore, not so concerned about knowing what course of action will lead me toward winning the elections; but I am, indeed, concerned about knowing whether there will be elections, whether the people will be able to vote, and to vote for whom they wish! In any event, I have, simultaneously, the information and intuition (in addition to a certain amount of moral conviction) that, in the next elections the people will vote in larger numbers for the PSDI than they have done (yet...).

'PSDI Will Win the Next Elections'

ESPRESSO: In other words,....

F.G.: In my opinion, the Socialist Party will win the next elections.

ESPRESSO: And what feeling does this evoke in you? A certain amount of apprehension?

F.G.: At no moment.

ESPRESSO: But history doesn't insinuate such a difficult, complicated country, with a whole lot of problems such as those currently facing Spain, disturb you?

F.G.: I don't think that I would have more worries than I have now. And what I do have represents the maximum dedication and effort. It would suffice not to be merely a witness, but to become a government as well; hence, to do things that I think should be done, to continue doing the things that I am doing....



In short, I would not be worried at all, nor would I fear joining the government.

EXPRESSO: In your everyday activity, when you go to the party, when you begin working, what is your greatest concern?

F.G.: I still think, and this idea has becoming increasingly entrenched in me (and my maximum effort is aimed in this direction) that the most important thing is for us to continue living in liberty and peace. That is my concern every day! A concern that has caused me to be a cautious and moderate person.

EXPRESSO: You mentioned effort and dedication. But I insist: how can one struggle for peace when the rules of the game are not kept by both sides? How can you call for peace and liberty, when you have for enemies individuals lying in wait, who want the opposite of what you want, and who use unequal weapons?

F.G.: I have been asked that question more than once. And I have answered with a kind of parable that seems to me to be directed at the heart of the matter. If we have to guard a forest, we do not assign a firebug as a forest guard. I think that this is sometimes the mistake that has been made. There is placed in a position of responsibility, so that the woods will not burn, a firebug who would like to see the woods burn.

The Firebugs

EXPRESSO: Who are the firebugs? Where are they?

F.G.: They are individuals who hold key positions....

EXPRESSO: In the Army?

F.G.: The tragic problem lies in the fact that the Army is usually identified as a group of men. That distinction must be made, and I always make it. What I say is that there is not a single political system (democratic or non-democratic) which entrusts positions of responsibility in the state, for its very security and survival, to individuals who do not believe in that system! But don't ask me to state publicly whom I am thinking of!

The Argentine Specter

EXPRESSO: So be it! But in your opinion, wasn't the fact that there was recently an attack against the very position of the king, in the person of his chief of the Military Household, a revealing and frightening sign?

F.G.: There is not the slightest doubt that it was a provocation. The far left terrorists are fulfilling objectives that benefit the far right, and what this does is feed that spiral of terrorism. In both instances, an attempt is made to liquidate the democratic state. When the terrorists are of the far right, they think that, after this process, they will have an opportunity to observe the advent of an authoritarian, military, right wing government. And they also think that, once an authoritarian regime has been imposed, there will no longer be a return to liberty, because when there is an easing again, the social tensions will preclude the

existence of another democratic civilian regime. Unfortunately, it is this type of process on which countries such as Argentina have embarked. The military government yields its position to the civilian one, a disaster is brought about, the military return, and so on. . .

As for the far left terrorists, they think that, by attacking democracy, they can cause a coup, and that coup, in turn, can bring about so many tensions in the society that their own positions will gain ground. If that were true, they would be right historically; and they would be right for the following reason: Because people with deep convictions, as in my case, for example, convictions about socialism and democracy, in this Spain which would give us as a legacy a dictatorship of 3, 4, 5 or 6 years, those people would have very little to do. They would have to recreate the hatred, revenge and fatal confrontations, and it would be a left wing extremism or a right wing extremism that would have the way paved for it. And I think that, in the end, it would be the right wing extremism that would always win, in this part of the world!

#### Criticizing the Government With Discretion

EXPRESSO: How would you combat terrorism if you were in the government? You criticize the government from outside, but if you had to decide, what would do?

P.O.: I have not made much criticism of the government, and what I have made has been expressed with considerable discretion. And I have also reflected on what else would need to be done to combat terrorism. I think that the antiterrorist legislation that exists is sufficient. What is lacking are technical mechanisms, things as important as a better operation of the intelligence services, unification and coordination of those services, greater and better technical backup from the police, and stringent selection of individuals who can be absolutely trusted in the upper echelons of the battle against terrorism. And there is still lacking something that is extremely important: creating a social awareness for putting an end to the terrorism.

In any event, all this is now starting to be created. For example, the 2 minutes of silence recently in Spain had a fundamental significance; they made the entire country stop, in protest against terrorism. On that basis, one can find a collective cooperation which is essential for terminating the terrorism. Now then, those citizens must be confident in the government that is battling against terrorism. Furthermore, they must be completely convinced that the government is doing what it can. . . . Then, it must be helped to do even more.

EXPRESSO Adds Nothing. . .

EXPRESSO: Isn't this what is taking place?

P.O.: It is my opinion that, sometimes, when a little ground is gained, that confidence is lost. And this is the most serious thing of all. . . . That is why I think that further progress can always be made in this struggle.

EXPRESSO: To change the subject: I think that I heard you quoted as saying, a few days ago, at a major European meeting of Socialist and Social Democratic Parties,

with reference to NATO, that you would not have any misgivings about underwriting your country's entry into the Atlantic organization if it could contribute to the stabilization and consolidation of democracy in Spain, but that the example of Turkey, a country which has joined NATO and is currently subjected to a military regime, has left you with great misgivings about the efficacy or importance of that affiliation....

F.G.: It is my opinion that Spain's entry into NATO does not represent any greater security for Spanish citizens, nor greater prosperity, nor a greater contribution on the part of Spain to the easing of difficulties and international peace. As a result, they would have to explain to me the political reasons that exist for Spain's entry into NATO. The fact is that no one has yet succeeded in explaining them to me, thus far; not even from a defensive standpoint (a rather cheap philosophy), does NATO add what we would like to be the structure of Spanish security.

There are, obviously, some arguments claiming that NATO is a guarantee for democracy, and a pact among free countries for the defense of the democratic, pluralistic systems of the West. I am in the habit of remarking sometimes, in a joking tone, as I did during my visit to Great Britain, for example, that I think NATO guarantees democracy in all the countries where that is not necessary, and that it does not guarantee it where it would be necessary.

I am convinced that democracy must be guaranteed by each country and each society. And don't give me the example of Great Britain, because that country has always been a democratic nation, with or without NATO! Give me as an example countries such as Greece, Portugal and Turkey!

Portugal should not have entered NATO before 25 April, if that organization were actually an alliance among free, democratic countries. Greece should have been protected from the coup of 1967; but, on the contrary, it was a NATO operation that brought the Greek colonels to power.

NATO is essentially a defense pact, and I think that it would be best to unmask it. If it is a defense pact, we must ask ourselves whether NATO can defend us, Spain. And my military strategist will tell you that Spain's dangers lie on the southern flank, that is, in North Africa. Now NATO has expressly stated that there is no defensive potential on that flank. It is thinking precisely of the northeast flank, in the direction of the Soviet Union.

Communists Will Lose Again in France

COX/SHO: I would now like to mention to you a matter that I think is dear to you: the victory of Francois Mitterrand. How do you view the situation there? Do you think that the Socialist Party will have a majority in Parliament?

F.G.: In my opinion, the Socialists will obtain over 30 percent of the representation in Parliament. I think that the Radical Leftist Party will be reinforced, and that there will be a possibility of establishing a government quite similar (although obviously not identical) to the one that exists at present in France. Well, that is my opinion, and I don't know whether it is the plan of the French Socialist Party. Turning to the legislative elections, I think that the Communists will lose again.

EXPRESSION: If, in your opinion, the Communists will lose again, how can Francois Mitterrand obtain a parliamentary majority?

F.G.: We shall see, after the elections. But, in any case, it is not clear that they will not win that majority, because there will be a part of the center electorate willing to go along with the political game of a Socialist government.

EXPRESSION: Or would the contrary occur? That is, will not that moderate center electorate vote for the right, fearing the possibility of France's having Communists in the government, fearing possible social tensions, etc. . .

F.G.: No, I don't think so. In my view, the right will not win. There is at the present time a dynamics clearly favoring Mitterrand, and I also think that his victory was based on a message of liberty and progress....

EXPRESSION: ...and moderation.

Mitterrand 'Born To Be President'

F.G.: When I talk about liberty and progress, I am talking essentially about a moderate message and, in particular, a message that the Communists have helped to strengthen with their lack of skill, and with attitudes and positions which in my opinion were close to fascist positions. And that harshness on the part of the Communists has caused Socialism to appear in France as the real alternative to the situation created by Giscard D'Estaing.

EXPRESSION: Will Mitterrand be capable of forming that sufficiently moderate government not to drive anyone away, and sufficiently strong government to exist and endure?

F.G.: I think so, because Mitterrand's image may grow historically in the post of president of the republic. In other words, I think that Francois Mitterrand will improve his own share of responsibility as president. To put it differently, it is as if he were born to be president!

EXPRESSION: You recently described yourself as "cautious and moderate." In speaking about Mitterrand, you also used the term "moderate." So I would ask you: why is it that the left now feels the need to label itself with that term? So as not to cause alarm, so as better to convince people?

F.G.: But I think that societies are evolving, and as they develop they become "tempered," and that the alternatives have to be offered so as to gain social majorities. In my view, I do not consider it good politics to offer alternatives of a purely ideological nature, so as to retain only a very small portion of the society. Therefore, when we are fully convinced of their ideas, we must act so that they will be accepted by the majority of the society, so that it will be possible to go forward with them.

But there is also another major phenomenon of a universal nature. It is that people do not change from one day to the next; they change in historical periods, which on occasion extend for a long time.

EXPRESSO: Is that what has happened now in France, for example?

F.G.: In France and virtually all over the world. And only those with the ability to observe an historical plan extended in time can really convince the society, and lead it toward that plan.

That is what happened, for example, in Sweden, with democratic socialism. And the great mistake of the left in southern Europe is that it has always been a left that wanted to invent the future, more than govern the present. Now there is no solution other than to pay attention to what is desired for the future and what can be changed at present. I think that we are emerging from this mistake; therefore, I have hope that Papandreu will win in Greece, in the fall....

EXPRESSO: And what about you in Spain, in the year....

F.G.: I sincerely believe that the PSOE will win in Spain, and for the very reason that I have just stated. I sometimes tell my comrades that we must make a program, a plan, with the conviction that we must develop it in 25 or 30 years, not in 2 years. It is this which will give us the key to gaining the people's confidence, and also the calmness with which to govern.

EXPRESSO: Therefore, you are not in a hurry.

F.G.: If we had done things in this way in 1931, we would have gained 30 years. We were incapable of viewing matters in this way. It is our share of responsibility for a far more difficult society.

#### PSOE Wants To Have an Autonomous Strategy

EXPRESSO: Do you think that this historical plan that you mention entails somewhat of a moderate, strong, Socialist Party, but without the collaboration of Communists, in a government alliance, for example?

F.G.: I never like to define things in a negative way, but rather positively! I can, essentially, carry forward a plan that is capable of being autonomous, which is something different; a plan capable of having its own identity, its own autonomy; one which, at a given time, could reach (if it does not have the majority of the society on its side) a compromise with another political force, which would be more feasible for implementing that plan.

For example, in the Spanish municipalities, in 1979, we considered it feasible to reach a compromise with other leftist forces, and with nationalist forces in Catalonia; and we also attempted it in the Basque Country. And this provided a certain type of alliance. It does not mean that I am going to have a permanent alliance with the Communist Party, or with the nationalists. It means that, at that time in history, I thought, and believed, that this was what was suitable for Spanish local political action, and therefore I acted in that way. What I don't want is to have inflexible compromises.

#### Tamames Versus 10 Percent of the PC Votes

EXPRESSO: There are two aspects of Spanish internal politics that interest me in particular. The first is an attempt to learn the reason why Tamames left the PCE



[Spanish Communist Party]. In your opinion, what was that reason? You are an informed person....

F.G.: I think that he wanted to leave the Communist Party a long time ago. There could be several reasons. However, those which he gave are respectable: That there is not enough internal democracy in the Communist Party, that he could not remain in it because they would not accept his criticism, etc.

EXPRESSO: In your view, is there internal democracy in the PCE?

F.G.: I think that there are rather serious problems of internal democracy in the Communist Party; but I think that there is another important reason. It is that the PC has 10 percent of the vote. For anyone who wants to engage in politics from a personal standpoint, this is a very sizable obstacle. It is a very difficult "limitation" to surmount personally. I think that this is the other reason.

Suarez: Losing On All Fronts

EXPRESSO: The other question is, why did Adolfo Suarez resign?

F.G.: He did not tell anyone. But I sincerely believe that it was the party itself which ousted him. I also think that he lost the confidence and the backing of the world of finance, that is so important for a right wing government; that he lost the backing of the Church, and that he lost the confidence of other institutions which I do not care to name. And, furthermore, he lost the confidence of his own party. I think that this is what prompted him to leave the government. There is something else as well: It seems to be the fashion now to leave, so as later to be called upon!

The King Is On This Side of the Line

EXPRESSO: This seems to be a joke on yourself...! In conclusion: Do you think that the king, if faced with the prospect of a group of military men intending to carry out a coup, would respond...in what way? How would he react?

F.G.: The king is on this side of the line. It is my absolutely sincere opinion that the king is on this side of the democratic institutions, and that those who take a stand on that side of the democratic institutions will have to fight against the king...among many others.

EXPRESSO: Finally...still another question. Despite the fact that people in Spain today are experiencing tensions and worries, after this calm, clear interview that I have had with you, I have the impression that you sleep well, that you manage to sleep well. Is it true?

F.G.: It is true. (He laughs, lighting the cigar for the umpteenth time.) I will tell you even more. I sleep, and before sleeping I even read. I have just now finished reading that small marvel, the latest book by Gabriel Garcia Marquez! As you can see....

2909

CSO: 3101/91

## PARLIAMENT ENDS SESSION WITH NEW GOVERNMENT POLICY UNCLEAR

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Jun 81 p 2

[Editorial by Olof Kleberg: "The Opposition Debates"]

[Text] That was a noteworthy debate between the party leaders in the Riksdag yesterday. There stood the minister of economy, responding for the supplementary bill which was being discussed--but now as the leader of the conservative opposition. And there stood the same Gosta Bohman and debated with the social democrats about liberalism and freedom. And there also--although more hidden--the two government parties assembled to create broad solutions without socialism. But the interest on both sides (of the middle) seemed limited.

Gosta Bohman's interest in liberalism is now passionate. But also revealing. He proclaims a liberal revolution which will allow people to work, to take initiative and responsibility.

He was also bold enough to raise two important objections against conservative liberalism: the lack of both social solidarity and just distribution. There is no antagonism between the "open" society which the conservatives also call liberal and a secure society, he said. Greater freedom at the polls gives security.

A policy of just distribution is certainly one of the conditions for progress--but it can also work against this progress. Distribution is not the same problem now as it was in the 40's and 50's, he continued.

Gosta Bohman's defense for his liberal variant was significant. Greater freedom at the polls for the unemployed, helpless, poorly housed, sick? Distribution--what power is it which makes this less of a problem? And is it such a small problem?

Ola Ullsten, leader of the Liberal Party, could effectively explain a new report from the Central Bureau of Statistics about the living conditions of people in Sweden. There the existing chasms are clearly shown: social inheritance, poor education, poor health, heavy work, often followed by dismissal.

Olof Palme delivered a basically social-liberal sermon about solidarity and for the defense of Bertil Ohlin. One wondered if he considered himself a stand-in for Ullsten--who was sent in very late in the debate. But that impression did not last very long. The main point of Palme's message for the coming year's election

campaign was "popular rally" according to Ernst Wigforss' formula. But that rally was simultaneous with a rally around social democracy.

After such a declaration it was meaningless when both he and Kjell-Olof Feldt wanted the middle parties to break out of the bourgeois block. They claim to be seeking solutions over block boundaries--but then the social democrats must also be prepared to take some steps.

It is unclear how the government of the middle is going to act after the debate by the party leaders. Gosta Bohman is afraid that it is too weak and that it can be formed without the conservatives. Palme is afraid that it will collect votes from the social democrats and coax them to join an election victory in 1982. And I myself think they do not know where they are going.

What is required is a conscious and united policy if both Sweden and the middle are to ride out the storm.

9287

CSO: 1109/204

FALLDIN SEEN IN POSITION TO TAKE 'REVENGE' ON BOHMAN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Jun 81 p 10

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "Falldin Wants Revenge"]

[Text] Thorbjorn Falldin is in the mood for returning to the leadership of the bourgeois parties, with Ola Ullsten trailing him. Nuclear power is out of the policies, and Bohman is out of the government. That is the final result of the spring session of the Riksdag, which ended on Wednesday to be followed by the Center Party meeting at Ronneby. After having sat for a long time more or less shackled in the government office building, Thorbjorn Falldin can again begin to fight for his political survival.

Political discussions are not exactly the most important task confronting the Center Party meeting. A Center Party meeting is more of a folk festival and general being together than the occasion for serious political discussions.

And yet it must be realized that the Center Party is standing at a crossroads. The crossroads will leave its mark on the meeting, as will Falldin's appearance before the mass media. During the entire decade of the 1970's the center was the dominant bourgeois party, but that role is about to go to the conservatives.

Falldin must take himself by the lapel, give the party a more definite profile, and put the conservatives in their place.

#### A False Debate

For a long time nuclear power was the millstone around the neck of the Center Party. It blocked out all other questions, and the Center Party attained the reputation of being a one-issue party. Furthermore, Falldin became touchy during the false debate.

And the nuclear debate was not nearly as vote-getting as Falldin thought when in 1973 he changed policies at the national meeting in Lulea. Nuclear power became a burden on three-party cooperation, as much for Falldin as for the Center Party and the other government parties.

Now the nuclear power question is more or less removed from the program because of the Riksdag decision in the spring about energy. Instead of reactor exercises the political parties can now work together to concentrate on saving energy and bringing in new energy sources. Many center voters are greeting this change with relief.

#### New Platform

The tax question was for a long time a serious burden for the center. Center Party voters did not trust the proposal for tax reform which the bourgeois three-party government put forth in March. It is not possible to get a majority for this large reduction in income tax in the Riksdag against the social democrats and the communists.

The tax settlement with the social democrats, and thereby with LO (Swedish Trade Union Confederation) has changed the situation. The center has acquired a platform to work from. They say that job satisfaction is beginning to return.

Falldin has long concentrated on holding the three-party government together, and even expected praise and voter support for that thankless task.

The result was the opposite. Bohman and his party secretary have had free rein to commit havoc on the streets and market places and in the mass media without Falldin so much as blinking.

#### Bohman's Right of Veto

As prime minister, Falldin could several times have said to Bohman, "You can take that or leave the government."

The fact is that never happened. Not even when it concerned the center's favorite, NCB [expansion unknown]. Bohman was allowed a veto right in the government.

Instead Bohman threatened several times to leave the government. In spite of all the promises that the conservatives would never split a three-party government.

The result is apparent: Bohman has finally left the government entirely on his own and in a situation where middle-income wage earners are promised 1,000 kronor per month reduction in taxes, but with a 1-year delay.

In the end it was an advantage for Falldin that he showed patience with Bohman, in spite of the Center Party during that time losing half of its voters, many of whom went over to the conservatives.

#### Falldin Greedy

In the new situation now prevailing in Swedish politics it is a fact that Falldin has not given up. Falldin is a greedy person and he does not want to go into history as a political catastrophe, who both split his party in half and failed to lead two bourgeois majority governments.



At the national meeting of the Center Party, Falldin's mood is one of revenge, to regain the bourgeois leadership with Ullsten trailing behind him. Experience indicates that when there is a bourgeois triangle drama, two parties often gang up on the third.

Actually the conservatives have declared war against the other two bourgeois parties. Following the Norwegian model, they seem to believe in a sort of a change to a two-party system in Sweden, with conservatives and social democrats as the antipodes.

#### Boundary on the Right

When the conservatives declare war in this way against both the other bourgeois parties this gives Falldin his chance to appear tough toward Bohman (or his successor) and lay down a clear boundary on the Right. If it is conservative policies that Center Party voters want, let them vote for Bohman.

At the Center Party meeting Falldin is expected to reestablish himself as the prime minister candidate of the bourgeois parties for 1982. Bohman's claim to Falldin's job sharpens the antagonism between the center and the conservatives.

9287

CSO: 3109/204

## NEW AIR BASE ON JUTLAND TO AID IN DEFENSE OF NORTH SEA

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 May 81 p 10

[Article by Knut Falchenberg]

[Text] Every spadeful taken and every krone invested at Skrydstrup air base on Jutland is of direct importance to Norway's defense. Denmark is building a modern air base to accommodate two "Eskadrill" F-16s, capable of intercepting attackers before they reach Southern Norway. In peacetime, Colonel Bengt Larsen will trade air base resources for unemployed youth--as an educational offer.

Outwardly, there is little difference between Skrydstrup and NATO air bases in Norway. The difference would be that in some places in Norway there are nuclear-safe hangars inside the mountains. On the other hand, this Danish air base is spread across such a large area that military guards have been known to lose their way at night.

Another difference is that the 80 conscription soldiers at the base get more money than do Norwegian soldiers.

"I get 6,300 kroner a month," private Leif Lindvang told AFTENPOSTEN. According to Danish practice, he participated in the draft board "lottery." All eligible men draw a number; some escape military duty, others do not.

Leif Lindvang drew a number that led to the usual 9 months' service, compared to 15 months in the Norwegian air force. He goes home every night when he does not have guard duty and, when he is on leave, he travels free of charge on bus, train and ferry--whenever he wants to. Considering the pay and the steady work in the air force, he is well aware that in many ways he is far better off than many young people his age, who are unemployed.

The air base manager, Colonel Bengt Larsen, told AFTENPOSTEN that there are approximately 1,000 skilled unemployed youth in the area surrounding the base; young people who want to further their education in technology and electronics are lined up outside the gate. At the same time, the base lacks personnel due to a shortage of money.

This is the background for the colonel's initiative 1 April, which created quite a stir in Denmark. When a television team came to film the dedication of Denmark's first F-16 squadron, Bengt Larsen stood up and said he had the capacity to educate 100 persons a year who are eager to learn. In Larsen's opinion, it is better to spend money on education than social aid to youth. "If money could be transferred from the social budget to the defense budget, Larsen could guarantee a high-grade education where youth would be exposed to the same demands and conditions as regular technicians in training. But the youth on special contract should be exempted from military duty," according to Larsen.

Only hours after his television appearance, Larsen was asked to submit reports to the central staff and, today, the project has already been approved by the general staff as well as personnel organizations.

"The question of using existing base workshops, buildings and knowhow to provide an education for youth is being discussed by politicians right now," said the colonel, who was a technician himself before becoming a pilot. He stressed that the project in no way aims to train second-class technicians. "We can extend an offer to young people, but our technical demands will remain high," he told AFTENPOSTEN.

Skrydstrup has been a so-called "accessory base" for 28 years and has only lately been equipped to become an independent air base. With 1,100 employees it can handle most of the maintenance itself. Some 52 million kroner have been invested in buildings alone the last couple of years. Furthermore, large sums of money have been spent on advanced ground equipment to take care of the 58 new F-16s that are being delivered to Denmark. The first F-16 squadron was put into operation in April and the second will follow later this year. These new fighter planes replace the old F-100 "Super Sabres" we have had for more than 20 years, and they were purchased used at the time!

The air base is located approximately 50 kilometers from the German border. Short distances make it easy to share the responsibility of defense. The German marine air defense has ordered new "Tornado" planes which are well equipped to attack enemy vessels.

"This means that we can concentrate on enemy planes in a war situation," said Larsen. "Hence, Danish F-15s will only be equipped with guns and "Sidewinder" rockets, designed for air to air combat. They will not be equipped with special anti-ship rockets."

8952

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## CAUSES, NATURE OF CRISIS IN BUNDESWEHR PROBED

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 15 May 81 p 8

[Article by Hans Ruehle: "The Bundeswehr Is Suffering From More Than Hans Apel"]

[Text] Equipment and financial problems are merely the tip of the iceberg. Missing billions in the defense budget have shocked the public. But the Bundeswehr's actual problems go far beyond financial problems.

Since last fall's elections to the Bundestag hardly a week passes without more ill tidings from the defense ministry. Even public officials loyal to the government no longer have the courage to rely on official announcements from Bonn's Hardthoehe. It appears as if the defense minister and those around him had completely lost control over their area of responsibility, and that their statements are therefore no more than mere assumptions.

This applies first and foremost to the Bundeswehr's financial requirements, a problem which--for the Tornado weapons system alone--has meanwhile assumed catastrophic proportions. This political development and the nearly exclusive occupation with financial problems have also given rise to the impression that--aside from the inexcusable planning errors in budget requirements--everything is fine and dandy in the Bundeswehr. Therefore, it has been insinuated that the only thing needed is a reform of military supply and financial planning procedures in order for the Bundeswehr to regain its old image of a functioning, self-sufficient strike force.

## Effects on Training and Motivation

But precisely this is out of the question. For one, the damage caused by constantly differing statements by the defense ministry's political leadership is bound to be greater and of longer duration for an institution which has a traditional, still largely accepted and well justified reputation of absolute reliability of its official statements. The financial limitations imposed will have short-range effects on the level of training and motivation of military personnel and thus considerably reduce combat readiness and deterrence strength of the German army. But that is not all. The events of the last months are also symptomatic for many a fiasco in the defense ministry as well as the active armed forces.

The foremost and most far-reaching realization resulting from this situation is the fact that Hans Apel is not capable of carrying out this office. It is the result of a political SPD personnel policy in general and in particular, of the present chancellor who did not consider expertise necessary for this office, and apparently considered the office as a necessary prerequisite, if not a stepping stone, for higher political office. To be sure, this had proven to be true in the case of Helmut Schmidt--but in hindsight only because he left this post so quickly that the consequences of his decisions could no longer hurt him.

Apel, on the other hand, who began his office without any military training--his two predecessors had at least been on active duty during the war--and without any affinity to the armed forces, was lost from the very beginning, especially since his nature led him to compensate with daring, sometimes even boorish manners for his lack of knowledge. But the defense minister is not a minister like others. In addition to his ministry, he must lead an army of 500,000 men. Behind him is not a multitude of anonymous applicants, but rather soldiers who look to him as their highest ranking commander and demand exemplary performance.

This applies especially to commanding officers and NCO's, who must teach the military code of conduct to their men and who themselves must lead by setting an example. But what has been true for material for a long time is apparently also true for concrete models in the Bundeswehr: the gap between mission and means is constantly widening.

It would be unfair, however, to blame a minister unsuited for this office and his immediate administrative assistants for all problems. The military leadership also bears a good measure of guilt. Only in very rare cases does the "second pillar," the political leadership, get the bare facts about military necessities. In perfect "anticipatory obedience," military demands are tailored in advance according to the presumed wishes of the political leadership. If the minister is of different opinion after all, resistance is not very great as a rule. Hardly anyone thinks of strong reactions or even resignation. Although even in the latter case one would lose neither head nor pension, but would at most risk being discharged with a big military tattoo.

An example? If, as happened recently, the air force's inspector general has to accept that the annual flight hours for combat pilots are reduced to a number clearly below the minimum required by NATO because of fuel shortages, and the same conditions, which had caused anxiety to the public at the time of the Starfighter crisis, must be anticipated again, then only one option remains: resignation. However, General Friedrich Obleser remains in office, apparently undisturbed. Anyone belonging to the generation of the presently 30- to 40-year old officers clearly feels the reaction to such conduct by the highest military leaders: disappointment and resignation as never before. One of the best kept secrets of the defense ministry is the fact that the number of young officers--often highly qualified and trained--who wish to leave the Bundeswehr, even if it means losing any type of social security, is increasing dramatically.

Closely connected with this disappointment of younger officers about the lacking courage of many military superiors are wrong decisions made, for which military leaders either bore partial responsibility or even, as in the case of the "Model IV," full responsibility. One example is, e.g., the quarterly reorganization of companies. All the way down to the smallest units, every 3 months one-fourth of the men are exchanged. This prevents both meaningful training and the formation of small combat teams.



The "Model IV" reorganization has even presented unsolvable problems to the Bundeswehr. It is especially because of this reorganization that personnel strength in small as well as large units today is approximately 70 percent. This makes carrying out any mission more difficult, and commanders and draftees show the effects of this. Frustrations at every level are the necessary consequence.

However, the frustration which prevails especially in the middle ranks has other causes as well. In accordance with the political character of all military decisions through "anticipatory obedience," a "play-safe" practice of unimagined proportions has developed. If Parkinson could see who today in the defense ministry has to get involved in even the simplest procedures in order to create merely the formal prerequisite for a proposal, he would feel splendidly vindicated. It is obvious that such an awkward apparatus can hardly supply the political leadership with the necessary intelligence. But not only that. Those working within it see their individual responsibility reduced to zero, as well as having to operate with decision deadlines which are far too long as far as the troops are concerned. The consequence: in the individual case, they are constantly facing possible accusations of being lazy, and the ministry as a whole is growing more and more alienated from the troops.

The excessive bureaucracy growing within the Bundeswehr in general, of the defense ministry in particular, can be traced back to a central change in the Bundeswehr's history: The intrusion of the "civilian" element into the armed forces, when the social-liberal coalition came into power. The Bundeswehr was henceforth to be organized and run according to economic-industrial principles, and the training of commanders and NCO's had to be applicable to civilian life too. The present fiasco is at least in part the outcome of the efforts of these gentlemen who attempted to reform the Bundeswehr with slide-rule and graph paper.

This, however, is only a half-truth. Overemphasizing the significance of military equipment has also resulted in the fact that today the result of equipment checks has become more important for the career of a commander than the results of training and education of his men. It was only a matter of time before many company commanders and battalion commanders adjusted to this situation. The little screws and buttons had become more important than people, in the truest sense of the word. That a leadership elite following these criteria will not serve the best interests of an army can be felt in the Bundeswehr today.

Offering training for officers which would serve their civilian career proved necessary at first in order to recruit a sufficient number for an officers career. Since then, however, the obligatory college training for future officers has become more of a liability. There is a steadily growing number of those who wish to become officers but do not want to study first, especially if it is an unrelated field. In the troops also, the value of formal education continues to be disputed. If it is correct that in future, college graduates are to become company commanders after only 1 year of military leadership experience--until now it had been 8 years--then the Bundeswehr will face difficult times as far as education and training are concerned.

This is a critical area because of the strict separation--based on social-liberal theory--between service and free time in the military. At 1700 hours, soldiers customarily go off duty, and since they are stationed near their homes, many go home to "M" or to their girl friends for dinner. Those who remain behind often drown their

free time, which they do not know what to do with, in alcohol. The consequences are the often mentioned automobile accidents and sometimes overdramatized excesses in alcohol consumption. What is more important is the fact that the young recruits, who must be in the army for 8 hours a day, over a period of 15 months, but eat and sleep at home, do not develop an understanding for or taste of the role of the soldier, nor learn how to act in a society of men. In addition, since the time for daily training is limited, precious time, which could be used for training and education, is lost.

#### Political Involvement on Bases

Another undesirable "merit" of the social-liberal coalition, which discourages many soldiers, is the fact that the Bundeswehr is at least to a degree being politicized. This is primarily true for personal politics--always forcefully denied by those responsible, to be sure--but every active officer can cite at least one personal example, from which he either knows or must assume that political motivation inspired the individual recommending the promotion. Actual ability often plays no role at all. It is like deterrence: what is decisive is how the other side is perceived.

The result is understandable, as well as dulling: Some of the officers simply hope for improvement, some resign themselves, and some adapt--often against their better judgement--and join the SPD. And, in order to play it completely safe, the wife joins the FDP--after the motto: It will always be in power--or the CDU, which, it is believed, will provide the next defense minister when there is a change in government.

but personal politics is only one part of the political tag of the army. Since 1969, party membership of individual officers has for the first time since the Bundeswehr's existence become a conversation topic in many officer's clubs; this hitherto unknown eagerness to publicly profess political leanings has led to an escalation in political activities in many bases. The German officers corps has been split deeply, leading to nearly unbearable conditions in some units.

The Bundeswehr's greatest challenge, and the worst frustrations of the responsible commanders and NCO's, however, result from the neglect of what the British military expert Michael Howard recently called "the social dimension of strategy." The will is right. Although the Bundeswehr continues to have at its disposal modern equipment, the question remains whether in future too there will be sufficient personnel able and willing to operate these weapons. The army feels deserted more than ever before. There is a rumor about a new concept of "armed pacifism," of a "glimmering defense," where white flags are part of the basic issue.

9328

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## GENERAL DEFENDS TRAINING IN USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 May 81 p 10

[Article by Knut Falchenberg]

[Text] "It is no secret that we are training in the use of nuclear weapons here at Kolsas from time to time. Of course, Norwegian and Danish officers take part in these paper exercises together with other allied officers," lieutenant general Jorgen Brodersen told AFTENPOSTEN.

The retirement of the Danish lieutenant general in charge of NATO's northern command this month after 43 years of military service coincides with several important events: Discussions of Norway's and Denmark's possible restrictions on "the flying radar stations," the so-called AWACS. Furthermore, plans are under way to increase stockpiles in the northern command area. In case of war, the northern NATO command, with headquarters inside a mountain at Kolasas near Oslo, will have command over all the allied forces in Norway, Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein in northern Germany.

The fact that these military units are not under the control of NATO in peacetime, but rather the authorities of individual member nations, is an important principle. There are some exceptions, like the few fighter planes at Bodo airfield, for instance, which are ready for service at all times.

"So, when the German 6th division in Schleswig-Holstein is trained in the use of nuclear weapons it is not being directed from Kolasas?"

"It is true that the German force is in training and capable of using tactical nuclear weapons. Such weapons are also being stockpiled within reach in the area.

"But even though the 6th division falls into the Kolasas area geographically, it is not under our jurisdiction in peacetime. And, of course, no general is sitting here with his finger on the nuclear trigger. As you know, the release of nuclear weapons must have the political approval of the NATO Council and lastly of the president of the United States," said Brodersen.

But if this decision is made politically, must it be carried out by the military?"

"It is very clear that within NATO as a whole and here at Kolsas too we are training in the use of nuclear weapons. Not often, but now and then during so-called paper exercises, Norwegian and Danish officers do participate along with other international officers. They represent NATO during these practice sessions and not their own countries," said Brodersen.

He feels it is important to maintain perspective when it comes to NATO's nuclear weapons and their placement. These weapons are close to Scandinavia in all directions; they are stockpiled in Northern Germany, they can be found on aircraft carriers and in Great Britain, a short distance away by plane.

"And the planes will use Norwegian airfields?"

"There will be no need to stockpile nuclear weapons on Norwegian or Danish soil, nor within these countries' territories. There are no plans for that either," said Brodersen.

"I think it is useful to keep one thing clear when one thinks of nuclear weapons in connection with Scandinavia, namely that NATO in no way forces this matter. From a purely military point of view, I would say it is easy to live with the nuclear restrictions in Norway and Denmark," the NATO general told AFTENPOSTEN.

#### More Stockpiling

"Strictly militarily speaking, I would say it is more difficult to live with the restrictions imposed on foreign bases here in peacetime. It is obvious that the problem of reinforcements could be solved much easier if forces were stationed here at all times. But military bases are not acceptable politically nor desirable; hence, we have plans that enable us to transfer reinforcements on short notice."

Lieutenant General Brodersen said he expects Denmark will go through a procedure similar to that in Norway with respect to the issue of stockpiling heavy materiel. NATO, for its part, recommends that Denmark extend itself to the degree Norway has.

Brodersen is satisfied with the number of allied air squadrons that are supposed to be transferred to the area. "The weakness lies in the ability to make the proper provisions for them, to provide satisfactory defense of airfields and sufficient supplies and ground equipment. One of our biggest responsibilities here at Kolasas right now is precisely the work of improving these conditions."

He said that NATO's flying detection and radar stations, the AWACS, will be under allied command when they go into service some time in the future. "We are now working out details with respect to the operation of these planes, trying to incorporate the limits which each nation finds appropriate. These matters are under negotiation at the moment."

When Jorgen Brodersen retires, his post as lieutenant general shall, according to the system, be filled by a Norwegian. It will be Ingar Narvhus, former air defense inspector general.

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CSO: 3108/143

## COMMITTEE WANTS STUDY OF WAR EFFECT ON OIL SUPPLY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 May 81 p 4

[Text] A unanimous parliamentary justice committee has asked for a government analysis of Norway's need for oil and oil products in times of war so as to try to build up the necessary reserves. In its recommendation with respect to civilian preparedness, the committee points out that Norway cannot count on North Sea oil production under war conditions while import possibilities will be drastically reduced.

The justice committee's recommendation, which was submitted last evening, also stresses it will be sufficient to stockpile a normal 3 months' fuel supply of coal and coke.

However, the committee urges stepped up agricultural preparedness so as to be able to provide sufficient food supplies.

The popularly elected committee members are also of the opinion that transportation and communications preparedness must be kept at a high level. The recommendation stresses problems within the postal service if the data system were to break down in a crisis situation. Hence, the justice committee points to the need for planned alternatives in this area. It emphasizes the importance of the information sector, both in peace and in war. It states that radio, in particular, will be of service to the authorities in times of war--followed by the press.

Special attention is given to EDB (the Electronic Data Bank) because this type of material is very vulnerable in electronic warfare. The justice committee also asks the government to consider special efforts in this sector because of the low repair capacity domestically and because it will take time to improve this capacity and, consequently, our defense protection.

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CSO: 3108/149



GENERAL

FRANCE

BRIEFS

NEW INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR--Paul Roux, inspector general of the police, has been named Director of Intelligence Services at the Ministry of the Interior. For about the last year he was deputy director of the air and border police, but has spent most of his career in the intelligence service at Paris police headquarters. He is also a member of the board of the National Police Commissioners Union. He is succeeding director Raymond Cham at the Intelligence Service, who is retiring. Former union leader Gerard Monate, who was the founder and until 1975 the Secretary General of the powerful Autonomous Federation of Police Associations, has been appointed deputy to the chief of police. [Text] [Paris LE FIGARO in French 27 May 81 p 12] 9720

CSO: 3100/768

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